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ABSTRACT 
In general, because of the unpredictable nature of fire and the vanous 
uncertainties related, for example, to material properties at elevated temperature, 
the reliability of structural fire design can be justifiably questioned. 
In this project, a typical structural steel design for fire condition is assessed for its 
reliability. The assessment consists of estimating the probability of failure of 
structural steel elements exposed to a wide range of fully developed fires. A 
number of scenarios to account for different passive protection systems and the 
variability in properties of related parameters are modelled. The main tool of 
analysis is Monte Carlo simulation using ,a software named @RISK. The 
estimated probabilities of failure or reliability indices are measured against 
acceptable or target values so that definite conclusion with regards to safe or 
unsafe design can be made. The target probability of failure and the reliability 
index are also worked out in this project. 
The overall results show that applying reliability assessment to structural fire 
design is of great value in pointing out shortcomings in the design and in 
enhancing the performance assessment of real structures. 
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1.1 IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURAL STABILITY 
Structural stability of a building during fire constitutes one of the most important 
aspects of the overall fire safety of the building. In a fire situation, building 
should not collapse prematurely, if at all, and cause injury to the occupants or 
firefighters. Structural collapse normally means that building damage is more 
extensive and hence the economic losses are greater. To better appreciate the 
importance of designing and constructing building for structural stability during 
fire, one only needs to look at related statistics. As an example, structural collapse 
is one of the leading causes of firefighters' deaths in the United States (Dunn 
1988). Figure 1 below shows the distribution of firefighter deaths by cause of 
injury and by nature of injury in the United States in the year 1993 (NFPA 1994). 
Firefighter Deaths 
by Cause of lniury 1993 
Stress (48. 1 %) 
Firefighter Deaths 











(27.3%) Crushing (6.5%) . 
Figure 1 Distribution of Firefighter Deaths by Cause of Injury and by Nature 
of Injury in the US in 1993 (NFPA 1994) 
The figure shows that, in the United States in 1993, "struck by or contact with 
object" made up 32.5% of the cause of death to firefighters. This, and the other 
cause "caught or trapped" (15.6%) can be directly attributed to structural collapse 
of burning buildings. Structural collapse is deemed to have occurred even if a 
single structural element were to fail under a predefined failure criterion. 
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1.2 RELIABILITY OF DESIGN FOR STRUCTURAL 
STABILITY 
2 
Designing for structural stability during fire is one of the most difficult tasks 
faced by engineers (Fitzgerald 1997). This is due mainly to the extremely 
unpredictable nature of both the fire behaviour and structural responses of the 
building elements to fire. Design methodologies are based on very empirical 
studies of fire behaviour and the associated structural responses. The whole 
analysis contains a lot of approximations and assumptions. In short, design 
methodologies are always fraught with uncertainties and this raises the important 
question of how reliable is the structural fire design .. 
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF PROJECT 
The objective of this project is to illustrate why and how reliability assessment 
should be applied to structural fire design in order to achieve safe and reliable 
performance. Reliability assessment will specifically be carried out on typical fire 
engineering design of steel structure to illustrate the whole process. 
1.4 OUTLINE OF METHODOLOGY 
To achieve this objective, this project would first broadly preview the present 
structural fire design methodologies. The preview would then move into the field 
of quantitative risk assessment and touches on the areas of uncertainty and 
reliability analyses. The most appropriate quantitative tool would then be utilised 
in case studies involving real examples of performance of building elements 
under fire situation. The results of the case studies will form the basis of 
discussions about what constitutes acceptable probability of failure or reliability, 
and the possible implications on the codes, standards, or even the field of fire 




2 FIRE RESISTANCE AND FIRE SEVERITY 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
In fire engineering, and particularly with regards to structural fire design, the 
terms fire resistance and fire severity are frequently used. In fact any one term 
cannot be fully described and understood without attempting to do the same for 
the other. For this reason and because the terms are used extensively in this 
project, it is considered necessary to devote a section for explaining these terms as 
they are used in this report. 
2.2 FIRE RESISTANCE 
As a term that is frequently ascribed to the behaviour of building components 
under fire condition, fire resistance is a measure of a building component's ability 
to resist a fire. More specifically, the fire resistance of a building component or 
assembly is its ability to withstand exposure to fire without loss of load bearing 
function, or to act as a barrier against spread of fire, or both. It is often quantified 
as the time for which the element is expected to meet certain criteria when 
exposed to a standard fire resistance test. 
In most national standards the criteria are: 
(i) Stability - resistance to structural collapse 
(ii) Integrity- resistance to flame penetration 
(iii) Insulation- resistance to excessive temperature on the unexposed face 
Thus, the measurement of fire resistance has 3 components - stability, integrity 
and insulation, all of which are expressed in unit of time. 
2.2.1 Fire Resistance Rating 
New Zealand's NZS 1900 Model Building Bylaw(l) defines fire resistance rating 
as: 
"Fire Resistance Rating (FRR) means the minimum period of time for 
which all sides of an element of structure, any of which is subjected to a 
standard fire, continues to perform its structural function and does not 
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permit the spread of fire. Where a period of time is used in conjunction 
with the abbreviation FRR, it is required that the element of structure 
referred to shall have a resistance rating of not less than the period stated" 
Fire resistance ratings are usually assigned in whole numbers of hours in order to 
allow easy comparison with fire resistance requirements specified in building 
codes. For example, a wall that has been shown by test to have a fire resistance of 
75 minutes will usually be assigned a fire resistance rating of one hour. 
Fire resistance of any building elements depends on many factors, including the 
severity of the fire, the material, the geometry and support condition of the 
element, restraint from the surrounding structure and the applied load. Hence, fire 
resistance is not a material property in the sense that the yield strength is. 
2.2.2 Methods of Determining Fire Resistance 
With the recent advance in fire science and technology, there are now basically 
three different ways of determining fire resistance rating of structural members 
and assemblies. These three approaches are (i) laboratory testing, (ii) empirical 
correlations and (iii) theoretical calculations. (Lie 1992). They will be very briefly 
described below. 
2.2.2.1 Laboratory Testing 
Full scale testing is the most common method of obtaining fire resistance ratings. 
These tests are done in special test furnaces and should be carried out in 
accordance with procedures. The most widely used of these procedures are 
described in the "Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and 
Materials" ASTM E119 (ASTM 1988). This test method is used to evaluate walls, 
partitions, beams, columns, floor, and roof assemblies. Similar procedures are 
used for determining the fire resistance of door and window assemblies. In 
addition to ASTM, other organisations such as the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA), Underwriters Laboratories Inc (UL), and the British 
Standard Institution (BSI) also publish fire test methods which are virtually 
identical to those developed by ASTM and are generally considered to be 
equivalent. 
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There are three criteria in the standard test method. They concern load-bearing 
capacity, integrity and insulation. In many cases, not all criteria have to be 
satisfied. Beams and columns, for example, are required only to demonstrate 
ability to carry load for the fire resistance period. Non-load bearing walls, if used 
as a fire separation, only have to meet the requirement of integrity and insulation 
(requirement that limits the temperature rise on the unexposed face). A more 
comprehensive discussion of the ASTM test procedure can be obtained from Lie 
1992, Boring et al1981 and Babrauskas and Williamson 1978. 
2.2.2.2 Empirical Correlations 
Empirical equations presenting correlation of fire resistance test results with 
important design parameters started to emerge when sufficient test results become 
available to quantify the effects of critical parameters. Some of these equations 
were developed on the basis of theoretical predictions, and were subsequently 
validated by test results. 
The important points to consider in assessing the suitability of using these 
equations are (Lie 1992): 
• The scope of the database used to validate the empirical relationships, 
• The level of confidence in the calculated results, and 
• The applicability of the established relationships to the specific materials and 
products used in actual construction. 
With these words of caution, an empirical equation will be presented for 
illustrative purposes. 
Steel Columns Protected by Gypsum Wallboard 
A common protection for steel columns is to box it in using gypsum wallboard. 
Based on the results of accumulated fire-test data, a number of empirical 
equations have been developed to determine the fire resistance of columns 





R = 130 _12_ 
2 
R = fire resistance (minutes) 
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(4.1) 
W' = weight of steel column and gypsum wallboard protection 
per foot length (lb/ft) 
H = thickness of gypsum wallboard (inches) 
D = developed heated perimeter (inches), which may be defined 
as the inside perimeter of the fire protection. 
To derive the total weight W' of both the column and its gypsum wallboard 
protection, the following formula can be used: 
W'=W +50 hD 
144 
Where W =Weight of the steel per foot (lb/ft) 
(4.2) 
More of these empirical relationships for different building materials can be found 
in the following references: 
• Steel, concrete and timber: Lie 1992. 
• Concrete and timber: NRCC 1985; Lie 1977; Lie & Allen 1972; CSA 1984 
• Steel: Lie & Stanzak 1973: AISI 1980. 
2.2.2.3 Theoretical Calculation 
In recent years, considerable research has been undertaken with a view to 
developing analytical methods for calculating the fire resistance of structural 
elements and assemblies. Procedures are then validated against fire resistance test 
results. Analytical methods for determining fire resistance must consider three 
basic aspects of the problem: 
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(i) Fire characteristics 
(ii) Heat transfer, and 
(iii) Structural response. 
The fire characteristics refer primarily to its time-temperature relationship. The 
time-temperature relationships for the standard fire and "real" fire are described in 
details in chapter 8. The other important fire characteristic is the expected fire 
severity, which is explained in the next section. 
The heating of the structural member can be addressed using principles of 
convection and radiation heat transfer. Heating within the member is anlysed by 
conduction heat transfer. Heat transfer analyses can also be facilitated by the use 
of computer software. For example, FIRES-T3 and TASEF-2 are two computer 
programs for calculating heat transfer from fires to structures (Iding et al 1977 
and Wickstrom 1979). 
The structural response is determined by structural analysis calculations. The 
calculations are similar to those conducted for normal structural engineering 
purposes, except that only gravity loading (and thermal load) is considered and 
material properties are evaluated at elevated temperature. Computer software are 
also available for analysing structural responses. Examples are FIREDESIGN and 
FASBUS II (Anderberg 1985 and Jeanes 1985 respectively). 
Typical calculations for heat transfer and structural analysis are shown in chapter 
8. Some analytical methods for determining the fire resistance of building 
elements of various materials can be obtained from the following references: 
• Steel: Milke (1995); 
• Concrete: Fleischman (1995) 
• Timber: White (1995) 
The most important problem with regards to the use of a theoretical approach is 
that it requires access to a good database on material properties at elevated 
temperatures. Knowledge of the thermal and mechanical properties as a function 
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of temperature is critical to the accuracy of the calculation model. Database on the 
effects of temperature on the thermal and mechanical properties of materials have 
been compiled by many researchers (e.g., Harmathy 1983) but, generally 
speaking, the database is incomplete. As more elevated temperature 
measurements are made for different construction materials, the full potential of 
this design approach will gain significance in practice. 
2.3 FIRE SEVERITY 
Fire severity is a measure of the destructive potential of a fire. For a given fire 
severity, a building component of relatively lower fire resistance will be 
"destroyed" or lose its designed function earlier than a component of relatively 
higher fire resistance. Fire severity is most often defined in term of a time period 
of exposure to the standard test fire. However, real fires have very different 
characteristics from the standard fire and these have resulted in several methods 
of determining "equivalence" to the standard fire exposure 
2.3.1 Equivalent Fire Severity 
The concept of "equivalent fire severity" can be used to relate the severity of an 
expected real fire to the standard test fire. This is important when designers 
estimating real fire exposure want to use published fire resistance ratings from 
standard tests. The various methods of comparing real fires to the standard test 
fire are described below. 
2.3.1.1 Equal Area Concept 
The initial idea on equivalent fire severity was due to Ingberg (1928) who, 
following a series of compartment tests with known fire loads, suggested that fire 
severity could be calculated by considering equivalence of areas under standard 
fire time temperature curve and the compartment fire curve above a base of either 
150°C or 300°C as shown in Fig. 4-1 
BS 476: Pt. 20 
(150834] 
fe.d gives EQUAL areas 
respect to reference 
temperature of either 
1 -/L'/LQ2~~~~~Q2~~~~~~ 300°C or 1500C 300 1-
9 
Figure 2-1 Equivalence of fire severity based on areas beneath the standard 
and compartment fires' time - temperature curves. 
In this way, Ingberg derived a correlation between fire load measured in his tests 
as load per unit floor area and the standard fire resistance periods. However, this 
method has little theoretical justification because the unit of area is not 
meaningful. This method also appeared not to consider the effect of ventilation 
which would affect the equivalence, in that compartment temperature are affected 
by both the air supply and the fuel supply. This flaw led to the rejection of 
Ingberg's approaches and the formulation of alternative approaches 
2.3.1.2 Maximum Temperature Concept 
A more realistic approach, developed by Law (19710), Pettersson et al (1976) and 
others, is to define the equivalent fire severity as the time of exposure to the 
standard fire that would result in the same maximum temperature in a protected 
steel member as would occur in a complete burnout of the fire compartment. This 
concept is shown in Fig. 4.2 which compares the temperature in a protected steel 
beam exposed to the standard fire with those when the same beam is exposed to a 
particular real fire. 
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Gas temperature 
· standard fire 
te Time 
Figure 2-2 The maximum temperature concept for equivalent fire severity 
In principle, this concept is applicable to insulating elements if the temperature on 
the unexposed face is used instead of the steel temperature, and is also applicable 
to materials which have a limiting temperature, such as the 300°C temperature at 
which charring of wood generally begins. (Buchanan 1999) 
2.3.1.3 Maximum Load Capacity Concept 
In a similar concept based on load capacity, the equivalent fire severity is the time 
of exposure to the standard fire that would result in the same load bearing 
capacity as the minimum which would occur in a complete burnout of the firecell. 
This concept is shown in figure 4.3 where the load bearing capacity of a structural 
member exposed to the standard fire decreases continuously, but the strength of 
the same member exposed to a real fire increases after the fire starts to decay and 
the steel temperature decreases. 
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Figure 2-3 Equivalent fire severity based on load capacity concept 
This concept is the most realistic for load bearing members. The minimum load 
concept may be difficult to implement for a material which does not have a 
clearly defined minimum load capacity, which may happen for wood members 
where charring continues after the temperature decreases (Buchanan 1999). 
2.3.2 Time Equivalent Formulae 
A number of time equivalent formulae have been developed by fitting empirical 
curves to the results of calculations of the type shown conceptually in figure 4-2 
for the maximum temperature of protected steel members. Some of these 
formulae are described below. 
2.3.2.1 CIB Formula 
The most widely used time equivalent formula is that published by the CIB W 14 
(CIB 1986), derived by Petterson (1973) based on the ventilation parameters of 
the compartment and the fuel load. The equivalent time of exposure te (min) to an 
ISO 834 test fire is given by: 
(4.3) 
Where: ef is the fuel load (MJ/m2 of floor area) 
kc is the parameter to account for different compartment linings 
w is the ventilation factor (m-0·25) given by: 
Where: Af is the floor area of the compartment (m2) 
Avis the total window area (m2) 
(4.4) 
At is the total area of the bounding surfaces of the compartment (m2) 
Hv is the height of the windows (m) 
2.3.2.2 Law formula 
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A similar formula was developed by Margaret law on the basis of tests in small 
compartments (Thomas and Heselden 1972) and larger compartments (Law 
1973). The formula is given by: 
(4.5) 
The CIB and the Law formulae are only valid for compartments with vertical 
openings in the walls. The Law formula gives similar results to the CIB formula, 
generally with slightly larger time equivalent values (Buchanan 1999) 
2.3.2.3 Eurocode Formula 
The above formulae were later modified and incorporated into the Eurocode 
(EC1 1994), often referred to as the "Eurocode Formula" which gives time 
equivalence, te (min), as follows: 
(4.6) 
where kb replaces kc and the ventilation factor w is altered to allow for horizontal 
roof openings. The ventilation factor is given by: 
(4.7) 
w = ( 6.0 ]0.3 [0.62 + 90( 0.4- av )4] > 0.5 
Hr 1 +h .. a 11 
where: Hr is the compartment height (m) 
0.05 ::; Uv ::; 0.25 
ah::; 0.20 
bv =12.5(1+10av -ac2) 
Af is the floor area of the compartment (m2) 
Av is the area of vertical openings (m2) 
Ah is the area of horizontal openings (m2) 
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An important difference from the CIB formula is that the Eurocode equivalent 
time is independent of opening height, but depends on the ceiling height of the 
compartment, so the two formulae can give different results for the same room 
geometry. The results are similar for small compartments with tall windows, but 
the Eurocode formula gives much lower severities for large compartments with 
tall ceilings and low window heights (Buchanan 1999). 
Values of the terms kc and kb are given in Table 4.1, where they are shown to 
depend on the compartment materials (roughly inversely proportional to the 
thermal inertia). 
Table 2-1 Values of kc and kb used in time equivalence formulae 
~(k p Cp) 
High Medium Low 
Formula Term Units >2500 720-2500 <720 General 
CIB W14 kc Min m:L.:L:s /MJ .05 .07 .09 .10 
Eurocode kb Min m2/MJ .04 .055 .07 .07 
k=thermal conductivity (W/mK) p =density (kg/m3) cp= specific heat (JikgK) 
The 11 general II case is that recommended for compartments with unknown 
materials. It should be noted that kc and kb have slightly different numerical 
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values and dimension, because of the different ventilation factors in the respective 
formulae. 
Using typical thermal properties of the materials from Table 4-1, a building 
constructed from steel is in the "high" category, normal and lightweight concrete 
are in the "medium" category, gypsum plaster and any materials with better 
insulating properties are in the "low" category. 
2.3.3 Choice of Formula in This Project 
The Eurocode formula is used in the Approved Documents to the New Zealand 
Building Code published by the Building Industry Authority (BIA 1992). It will 
thus be the choice of formula for assessment in this project. 
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3 STRUCTURAL FIRE DESIGN- AN OVERVIEW 
3.1 DEFINITION 
Structural fire design is concerned mainly with the prevention of fire spread 
through separating vertical and horizontal partitions (compartmentation) and the 
avoidance or limitation of structural failure or damage - referring to fires which 
fail to be controlled at an early stage. The basic unit for structural fire design is 
the fire compartment or fire zone (CIB 1986). 
3.2 LEVEL OF STRUCTURAL FIRE SAFETY 
The level of structural fire safety to be provided by design should be governed by: 
(a) the risk to life and property in the case of a severe fire considered as an 
accidental situation; 
(b) the risk -reducing effect of structural measures, depending on the following: 
(i) Type (height) of building and its use, 
(ii) Occupancy of the fire compartment, 
(iii)Function of the various structural components. 
(c) the risk-reducing effect of non-structural measures for fire risk control should 
be considered, in particular in terms of reduced frequency of severe fires that 
may result. 
3.3 STRUCTURAL FIRE REQUIREMENT-WHOLE 
STRUCTURE 
Building structures should be designed, constructed and maintained so that they 
display an acceptable performance and fulfil specified functions in the event of 
fire (CIB 1986). These functions are explained below. 
3.3.1 Load Bearing Capacity 
The load bearing structure should adequately withstand all actions - including 
temperature, loads and imposed deformations - during fire exposure. This means 
16 
that the individual members have sufficient resistance capacity and that local 
failure will not necessarily entail collapse or instability of the whole structure or 
any major subassembly. At the same time, the total structure should have 
sufficient stability and ductility. 
3.3.2 Separating Function 
A fire compartment should adequately confine a fire to a limited area. Thus all 
vertical and horizontal partition surrounding a fire compartment should fulfil a 
specified separating function in terms of providing for sufficient thermal 
insulation and displaying sufficient integrity during fire exposure. 
3.3.3 Repairability 
Whilst designing for sufficient load bearing capacity generally ensures that the 
structure is not likely to collapse in the event of fire, it may be damaged to an 
extent requiring some degree of demolition and reconstruction. Hence 
repairability of the structure at reasonable cost may be required. 
3.3.4 Reserviceability 
In certain cases reserviceability of the structure after fire may be required. 
Reserviceability implies a limitation of damage to an extent necessitating only a 
short (or no) interruption of use of the building for repair. 
3.4 STRUCTURAL FIRE REQUIREMENT-INDIVIDUAL 
MEMBER 
The main requirement for individual structural element is the fire resistance. The 
meaning of fire resistance, fire resistance rating and method of assessment have 
been covered in section 2.2. 
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3.5 PRINCIPLES OF STRUCTURAL FIRE DESIGN 
Structural fire design generally consists of the following:-
( a) Assessment of the heat exposure and structural response, according to 
methods which are established for the type of material or construction; 
(b) Structural detailing which involves an adequate choice of the structural 
system, the geometry of the structure and its various components including 
supports, joints etc according to rules given in the relevant codes, standards 
and specifications; 
(c) Material detailing, i.e., an adequate choice of materials with specified thermal 
and mechanical properties, according to rules given in the relevant material 
related documents. 
Fire design should be in accordance with the state of engineering knowledge in 
this field. Design should be based on fire exposure to be expected under the 
conditions, either 
representative for the certain types of buildings and occupancy, or 
relevant for the particular application or use. 
Design verification should consider the frequency of fires, their expected severity, 
the nature of the thermal and structural response and the actions relevant in fire 
exposure as well as any model uncertainties. 
3.6 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS FOR FIRE CONDITION 
Structural analysis for fire is conceptually similar to structural design for normal 
temperature conditions. The design can be carried out in either the serviceability 
limit sate or ultimate limit state format. The main differences of fire design 
compared with normal temperature design are that at the time of fire (Buchanan 
1999): 
• the applied loads are less 
• strength of materials may be reduced by elevated temperatures 
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• cross section areas may be reduced by charring or spalling 
• smaller safety factors may be used, because of the low likelihood of the event 
• deflections are not important (unless they affect strength) 
• different failure mechanisms need to be considered 
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4 STRUCTURAL STABILITY DURING FIRE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As the title "Structural Stability during Fire" implies, this section addresses the 
design of the structural system of the a building in such a way that its primary 
load bearing members will not collapse prematurely in the event of a fire. 
Important aspects of this section include the regulatory requirements, specific fire 
safety objectives that can be pursued by providing structural stability, a discussion 
on how much fire resistance is required to be designed for to fulfil this objective, 
and what means are available to provide the necessary level of fire resistance. 
4.2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In New Zealand, the First Schedule to the Building Regulations 1992 is based on 
the Building Act 1991 and contains 35 working clauses. The clauses dealing with 
fire are: 
C 1: Outbreak of fire 
C2: Means of escape 
C3: Spread of fire 
C4: Structural stability during fire 
Each of these clauses is presented in the BIA handbook to the New Zealand 
Building Code complete with its relevant legal provisions, namely its objective, 
functional requirement and performance statements (BIA 1992). The clause of 
interest here, clause C4: Structural stability during fire is appended below: 
Clause C4- STRUCTURAL STABILITY DURING FIRE 
Objective 
C4.1 The objective of this provision is to: 
(a) Safeguard people from injury due to loss of structural stability during fire, 
and 
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(b) Protect household units and other property from damage due to structural 
instability caused by fire 
Functional Requirement 
C4.2 Buildings shall be constructed to maintain structural stability duringfire to: 
(a) allow people adequate time to evacuate safely, 
(b) allow fire service personnel adequate time to undertake rescue and fire 
fighting operations, and 
(c) avoid collapse and consequential damage to adjacent house units or 
other property. 
Performance 
C4.3.1 Structural elements of buildings shall have fire resistance appropriate to 
the function of the element, the fire load, the fire intensity, the fire hazard, 
and the height of the buildings and the fire control facilities external to and 
within them. 
C4.3.2 Structural elements shall have afire resistance of no less than that of any 
element to which they provide support within the same firecell. 
C4.3.3 Collapse of elements having lesser fire resistance shall not cause the 
consequential collapse of elements required to have a higher fire 
resistance 
The Building Industry Authority has dealt with each clause, presenting it as an 
Approved Documents providing non-mandatory guidance to a single method of 
compliance with the law (BIA 1995). Each Approved Document includes either 
an analytical Verification Method or a prescriptive Acceptable Solution, or both. 
A Verification Method is offered in the case of clause Cl but not for C2, C3 or 
C4. For each of the latter an Acceptable Solution is given. The Acceptable 
Solution for clause C4 is summarised below: 
Primary element loadings 
• To provide for structural stability of primary elements, they should be fire 
rated to avoid premature failure 
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• During a fire primary elements shall resist collapse under: 
a) The design dead and live loads required by NZS 4203 (SNZ 1992) 
b) Any additional load caused by the fire 
Non-evacuation 
• Special attention shall be given to situations where evacuation is either not 
possible or not desirable such as in buildings which: 
a) contain purpose groups SC (sleeping when in care of others) and SD 
(sleeping when in legal detention) or 
b) Are required to function continuously during an emergency, e.g., 
operations rooms in a civil defence headquarters or police station. 
• In such situations the accommodation concerned, the services to it, and the 
means of escape, shall remain safe for the duration of the a fully developed 
fire in an adjacent firecell. 
General principles 
• Factors influencing the necessary level of fire resistance include: 
a) Fire severity 
b) Building height 
c) Total fire load 
d) Purpose group 
e) Occupant load 
f) Capability of Local Fire service 
g) Availability of a water supply 
h) Level of fire safety precautions installed in the building 
• Primary elements are always rated for stability, but in some cases will also 
need to be rated for integrity and insulation. 
In the performance requirement C4.3.1 the word "appropriate to the function of 
the element" means that the required level of performance (degree of fire 
resistance) will vary according to design circumstances. With current technology, 
the collapse of a member subjected to the effect of a fully developed fire may be 
delayed a few minutes, a few hours or indefinitely. Delaying collapse indefinitely 
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is not always necessary. For example, small buildings from which occupants can 
escape rapidly in the event of a fire may not require any special protection against 
collapse and their design will satisfy the objective of life safety. Whether 
structural fire protection should be provided for these buildings, and to what 
extent it should be provided, becomes a decision that is based strictly on the 
economics of the situation. 
In a larger building, or one where occupants may have difficulty evacuating, the 
time required for a complete evacuation will be longer. Also, fire fighters will be 
expected to enter the building, assist in the evacuation and attempt to extinguish 
the fire. Collapse may be delayed by providing a higher level of structural fire 
protection in order to ensure the life safety of occupants and fire fighters. Again 
the level of protection above the minimum needed to satisfy the life safety 
objective will depend on economics. 
When the height or occupancy of the building is such that total evacuation is not 
possible, collapse of the primary structural members must be prevented for the 
period of emergency, and beyond. 
4.3 METHODS OF INCREASING FIRE RESISTANCE 
Structural system can be made more fire resistant by increasing the member sizes 
(structural over-design), by encasing the structural elements in an insulating 
material of low thermal inertia, or by protecting the entire assembly or system 
with an insulating membrane. The type of protection best suited for a particular 
system depends primarily on the type of material used in its construction, as each 
material behaves differently under elevated temperatures. A brief description of 
the important design parameters affecting fire resistance, as well as the most 
common types of protection for concrete, steel and timber structural system 
follows. 
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4.3.1 Concrete Construction 
Reinforced and prestressed concrete systems are rarely protected externally, since 
concrete is normally made of inorganic materials having low thermal conductivity 
and heat capacity. However, concrete gradually loses its compressive strength 
under increasing temperatures so that it is necessary to ensure that the members 
have been designed with sufficient reserve strength to support the applied loads 
for the projected duration of the fire exposure. 
Another important design consideration consists of making sure the steel 
reinforcement is sufficiently insulated, since steel loses considerable tensile 
strength at elevated temperatures. The critical temperature of steel is defined as 
the temperature at which only 60% of the original strength remains, at which 
point failure is imminent under full design loads. For regular reinforcing steel, the 
critical temperature is 538°C, whereas for prestressing steel bars, which are made 
of high carbon, cold drawn steel instead of low carbon, hot-rolled steel, the 
critical temperature is significantly lower at 427°C (Fitzgerald 1997). The time it 
will take for these temperature to be reached in concrete members (slab, beam or 
column) depends on the thickness of the concrete cover protecting the steel. 
The degree of restraint against thermal expansion, which every concrete member 
will undergo as its temperature increases, and the degree of continuity provided 
by the structural system at the supports, will also affect the fire resistance. Both 
are generally regarded as being beneficial insofar as concrete members are 
concerned. Restraint against expansion sets up additional compressive stresses 
which, when accounted for in the design, reduce the tensile forces that are initially 
resisted by the reinforcing steel in the bottom half of the member. Continuity 
enables a certain amount of stress redistribution to take place before excessive 
rotation develops at the supports and mid-span, causing the collapse of the 
assembly. 
4.3.2 Steel Construction 
Steel, like concrete, has the advantage of being noncombustible, but this 
characteristic alone means little in trying to resist collapse. Its high thermal 
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conductivity makes steel absorbs heat much more quickly than other materials; 
thus if the structural member has a relatively small mass, its temperature will 
increases very rapidly. Both the yield stress and the modulus of elasticity, the two 
material properties most important in determining load-carrying capacity, 
decrease considerably with increasing temperature (DeFalco 1974)). At a 
temperature of 593°C, these values will have fallen by at least 40% compared to 
ambient room temperature levels. This means that the strength of the steel 
member will be barely sufficient to resist applied loads (assuming normal safety 
factors). 
The mass-to -heated perimeter ratio for a steel structural member is a good 
indicator of its inherent fire resistance. A heavy steel column can absorb 
considerable heat and not reach its critical temperature before 30 to 40 minutes of 
exposure to a fully developed fire. On the other hand, open web steel joints and 
other light weight types of steel construction may fail within 5 to 10 minutes of 
exposure to the same fire. 
In order to achieve fire resistance ratings of one hour or more, a steel member 
must be protected by an insulating skin that will keep its temperature below the 
critical temperature. Encasement in concrete, brick, clay tiles, lath and plaster, 
and similar material used to be the common methods. Now, less expensive forms 
of protection have been developed, such as cementitious coatings and sprayed on 
mineral fibres, which can be applied directly on the steel members. Some 
intumescent paints and epoxy coatings have also been used to improve the fire 
resistance of steel members. These coating swells and form an insulating layer 
around the members when subjected to heat. 
As an alternative to encasement and surface treatments, the use of a suspended 
ceiling or protective membrane has been a common means of protecting steel 
floor and roof assemblies (Read & Adams 1979). The membrane usually 
contributes between 85 to 90% of the fire resistance of such assemblies; thus the 
type, thickness and fastening of the membrane are the most important design 
parameters. Lath and plaster, gypsum wallboard panels and inorganic acoustical 
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tiles supported on a metallic-grid system are the most popular membrane ceilings. 
They can be attached directly to the underside of steel framing members or hung 
with wire hangers from either the floor deck or the framing members. This allows 
flexibility in the depth of the concealed space, which is often used for electrical, 
plumbing and mechanical services. For these protective ceilings to be effective, 
however, it is critical that all services penetrations be adequately protected or fire 
stopped and that the integrity of the membrane not be destroyed during 
maintenance work in the concealed space. Also, when acoustical tiles are used on 
a metal grid system, they must be tied down with special clips so that they will 
not be uplifted by the positive pressure which may be created by a fire. 
A final aspect to consider when using steel in construction is its significant 
coefficient of linear expansion under elevated temperature. If the structural 
member is axially restrained against displacement (as column is), the expansion 
due to heat will be translated into thermal stress that will increase the overall 
stress level in the member and cause an earlier collapse. Without axial restraint, a 
steel member will expand and could set up eccentric loading of adjacent structural 
member by displacing one of their ends (for example, a beam displacing the top 
of a column or of a load bearing masonry wall). Good fire protection engineering 
dictates that either thermal expansion be prevented by limiting steel temperature, 
or its effect on the structure be accommodated in the design. 
4.3.3 Timber Construction 
Wood has the major disadvantage of being combustible. However, this does not 
mean that wood construction is less safe than steel or even concrete construction. 
The burning of wood produces a charred layer on the surface of a member, which 
acts to insulate the unburned wood from the heat being radiated by the flame. This 
slows down considerably the rate of charring, which will be relatively constant 
throughout the fire. The rate of charring varies according to the wood species and 
moisture content but is roughly 0.65mm/min for thick members (SNZ 1993b). 
Wood also has a very low thermal conductivity, which means that the inside of a 
wood member is little affected while the outside surfaces burn. In fact a 
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correlation exists between the strength of a burning member and its reduced 
cross-sectional area. The charred layer is presumed to have no strength, while the 
uncharred wood suffers a strength loss of only 10-15% (Lie, 1972). The term 
"heavy timber construction" refers to a combustible type of construction that 
utilises the property that large members which can burn for a significant period of 
time before their cross-sectional areas are reduced to the point of collapse. By 
carefully specifying minimum sizes for each critical component, building codes 
often consider heavy timber construction as equivalent to three quarter-hour rated 
combustible construction (Purkiss 1996 ). 
As with steel construction, wood floors and roof systems can acquire considerable 
fire resistance if the wood framing members are protected with an insulating 
membrane of lath and plaster or gypsum wallboard. The membrane can be 
fastened directly into the wood frame, provided the fasteners are sufficiently long 
to dissipate heat into the wood and prevent local charring that might cause them 
to pull out. Wood columns can be protected by intumescent coatings, gypsum 
board, or other mineral fibreboard developed specifically for the purpose. 
Although fire retardant treatments (surface applied or pressure impregnated) may 
delay ignition and therefore slow down the spread of flame along the treated 
wood members, they generally do not affect the rate of charring under fully-
developed fire conditions and, hence, they do not increase the fire resistance of 
wood members. 
4.4 APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING STRUCTURAL 
ADEQUACY UNDER FIRE 
Any approach for assessing the structural adequacy of a member or structure 
under fire conditions must address three matters (IE A 1989): 
(a) the temperature history of structural members resulting from the relevant fire 
situations, 
(b) the influence of this temperature history on the structural behaviour of a 
member or structure, and 
(c) the loads on the structure or member. 
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Temperature history of a member can be determined by calculation or test, and 
various combinations of test data and calculations are evident in the numerous 
methods that have been proposed for obtaining the time-temperature curves of 
members exposed to various fires. (Buchanan 1999) 
Given the temperature history of the structural member, the relevant mechanical 
properties can be modified for the effects of temperature. Anderberg (1976) has 
conducted an extensive research program on the behaviour of concrete under 
elevated temperature conditions and much is known about the influence of 
temperature on the mechanical properties of steel (Bennetts et al 1981 ). In the 
case of timber, it is common to ignore the material affected by the fire and base 
structural assessment on the remaining timber section with normal temperature 
properties (Lie, 1972) 
The combination of fire and other extreme loads is seen as an unlikely event. The 
relevant live load in fire is therefore taken as the arbitrary point-in -time live load 
and not the extreme or peak value. Wind, snow and seismic loads are not included 
in the analysis. 
The various approaches for assessing structural adequacy under fire condition are 
briefly outlined below (IE Aust 1989): 
Approach 1- Deemed-to-Comply (Member Performance) 
This consists of specifying standard dimensions to achieve a required fire-
resistance performance as measured by standard fire-test conditions. Examples of 
this approach are shown in Table 2.1, where the term FRL corresponds to fire 
resistance level. For the purpose of these examples FRL refers to the minutes with 
respect to structural adequacy deemed to be achieved for the constructions in a 
standard fire test. 
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Table 4-1 Examples of 'Deemed-to-comply' Approach for s'tructural 
Adequacy 
From I.E .A. 1989 
Thickness of Principal Material 
Construction of (mm) 
Structural Member Members FRL FRL FRL 
60min 90min 120 min 
(i) Non load Unplastered clay 100 
bearing wall brick 
(ii) Steel column Gypsum perlite 22 25 35 
plaster 
Deemed-to-comply methods have been employed in the various building codes 
for many years and have the distinct advantage of simplicity. The deemed-to-
comply geometries are based on available fire test data and, in many cases, 
guessworks. The disadvantage with this approach is that it is not well-based and 
sometimes can be unconservative. 
Approach 2- Standard Fire- Test and Variation (Member Performance) 
Another approach is to conduct a standard fire test on a member identical to the 
prototype in every way. The tested member must be supported and loaded in a 
conservative manner compared with the prototype. Although standard fire-tests 
must be conducted, this approach is very restrictive, as it is unlikely that a test 
conducted on a given member will be appropriate to other structural members. 
Approach 3 - Fire Test Series and Structural Engineering Calculations 
(Member Performance) 
In this method, a series of fire tests are conducted and the test results are 
interpreted using an engineering analysis with regard to both the thermal and 
structural response. The advantage of the method is that it allows economic use of 
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fire test data in that once a minimum number of tests have been conducted, other 
cases not covered by the tests can be handled by means of interpolation. 
Approach 4 - Standard Fire-Test Simulation: Calculation Based on Assumed 
Properties (Member Performance) 
For structural members constructed of materials such as masonry, steel, and 
concrete, it is possible to calculate theoretically the performance of a member in a 
standard fire-test. This approach has been used to provide the basis of design rules 
for reinforced concrete and composite members. To be effective, it is important 
that conservative, but representative, thermal and mechanical properties have 
been established for elevated temperature conditions. This has certainly being 
done for concrete, steel and masonry. Such material are inherently more 
predictable, from a thermal performance point of view, than some forms of 
lightweight fire protection in which complex internal reactions take place during 
heating. Once the thermal behaviour of the structural member under simulated 
standard fire-test conditions has been established, the structural behaviour can be 
computed using the appropriate methods. 
Approach 5 - Standard Fire Test Simulation - Calculation Based on Assumed 
Properties (Structure Performance) 
This approach is identical to Approach 4 but relates to the behaviour of a building 
structure in that it would enable evaluation of the structural adequacy of an entire 
building with fire in one compartment. The American Iron and Steel Institute 
(AISI) has used this approach for several large building project in the United 
States by using the program FASBUS. 
It needs to be emphasised that such an approach goes well beyond the current 
regulatory approval system, which looks only at isolated members and not at their 
interaction. The cost and time involved in undertaking such analysis will 
considerably be greater (and more complex) than the normal analysis of the 
structure. Although useful for certain isolated cases and as a research tool, this 
approach should not be considered for most situations. 
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Approach 6 - Standard Fire-Test - Equivalent Time Method (Member 
Performance) 
All the above methods have been related to the standard fire-test or the heating 
environment associated with it. The equivalent time have been proposed by 
Odeen (1970), CIB (1986) and more recently by Eurocode (EC1 1994) as a means 
of relating a "real" fire environment back to an equivalent exposure under 
standard fire-test conditions. Equivalent time is explained in section 3.3 of this 
report. 
Once the equivalent fire-exposure has been determined, the member can be 
assessed using any appropriate structural methods. 
Approach 7- "Real" Fire Analysis (Structure Performance) 
As with approach 6, this method can be applied to fire compartments in buildings 
with specified occupancies. In particular, it is typified by that given by Pettersson 
et al (1976) where "real" fire temperature-time curves have been prepared for 
compartments with various degrees of ventilation, fire load, and broad categories 
of lining materials. A more recent representation of the "real" fire is the 
"parametric" fire formula proposed by Eurocode (EC1 1994). Once the fire 
temperature-time response has been established, the structural behaviour can be 
determined using the appropriate structural methods. 
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5 UNCERTAINTIES IN STRUCTURAL FIRE DESIGN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of structural fire engineering design is the assurance of structural 
performance under fire conditions. However, most planning and design of 
buildings to be structurally safe under fire condition must be accomplished 
without the benefit of complete information; consequently the assurance of 
performance cannot be fully guaranteed. Many decisions that are made during the 
process of planning and design are invariably made under conditions of 
uncertainty. All quantities (except physical and mathematical constants) that 
currently enter into engineering calculations are in reality associated with some 
uncertainty. This fact has been implicitly recognised in current and previous 
codes. If this were not the case, a safety factor of only slightly in excess of unity 
would suffice in all circumstances. Therefore, under fire situation, there is 
invariably some probability of non-performance or failure of the building 
structure together with its associated consequences. The determination of 
appropriate standards of safety requires the quantification of these uncertainties 
by some appropriate means and a study of their interaction for the structure under 
consideration. It is also now widely recognised that some risk of structural failure 
must be tolerated (Hart, 1982). The main object of structural fire design is 
therefore to ensure, at an acceptable level of probability, that the structure will at 
least remain stable under a fully developed fire for sufficient time to allow the 
occupants time to escape and fire service personnel to undertake rescue or 
firefighting activities. 
5.2 UNCERTAINTY IN ENGINEERING DESIGN 
In general, structural reliability analysis is concerned with the rational treatment 
of uncertainties in structural engineering design and the associated problem of 
rational decision making. Uncertainties need to be identified and classified so that 
their relevance to the problem at hand can be ascertained. Before doing that it is 
helpful to introduce the concept ofbasic variables. 
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5.2.1 Basic Variables 
For the purpose of quantifying uncertainties in the field of structural fire 
engineering and for subsequent reliability analysis it is necessary to define a set of 
basic variables. These are defined as the set of basic quantities governing the 
static or dynamic response of the structure. Basic variables are quantities such as 
mechanical properties of materials (e.g. yield strength), geometrical quantities 
(e.g. section modulus), unit weights, external loads (e.g. dead load), etc. They are 
basic in the sense that they are the most fundamental quantities normally 
recognised and used by designers in structural calculations. Thus, yield stress of 
steel can be considered as a basic variable, although this property is itself 
dependent on chemical composition and various micro-structural parameters. 
Ideally, basic variable should be chosen so that they are statistically independent 
quantities. However, this may not be possible if the strength of the structure is 
known to be dependent on, for example, any two mechanical properties that are 
known to be correlated, e.g. the tensile strength and compressive strength of a 
batch of concrete. 
5.2.2 Types of Uncertainty 
In general, a wide range of uncertainties needs to be considered in structural fire 
engineering. These might include various environmental conditions, workmanship 
and human error, and prediction of future events. Various quantitative techniques 
are available for systematic identification of uncertainties. These include "event-
tree analysis" (Henley and Kumamoto 1981) and "hazard scenario analysis" 
(Schneider,1981). More generally, techniques such as "brainstorming" 
(Osborn,1957) may be used. All techniques amount essentially to a critical 
analysis of the problem to be analysed, consideration of all imaginable 
consequences and all imaginable possibilities and retaining only those with some 
finite probability of occurrence. Further, all techniques rely on having available 
expert opinion for the various assessments to be made and up-to-date information 
on which to base these assessments. 
To illustrate where and how different types of uncertainty can arise in man's 
attempt to understand and make use of a natural phenomenon (e.g., fire) to serve 
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Figure 5-1 Interrelationship of Uncertainties in Reliability Assessment 
Source: Melchers 1987 
Figure 4-1 shows a situation where a fire engineer, say, is required to undertake a 
unique fire engineering design. To do this he or she has to try to know and 
understand as much as possible about the fire phenomenon. In a scientific 
approach to his problem he would set up a model that could approximate the 
effects of the phenomenon. For the model to be accurate he has to rely on his own 
observation of the physical aspects of the task at hand and to make his own 
prediction on any aspect that is not apparent from observation. The accuracy of 
his modelling would be enhanced if he can make use of similar observations 
carried out by fellow human beings - that is, the available statistical data. The 
accuracy or reliability of such data depends, of course, on the human factors. The 
various aspects are dynamically interrelated and uncertainties definitely arise in 
each area. These uncertainties are further explained below for the case of 
structural fire design. 
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5.2.2.1 Phenomenological Uncertainty 
Fire is certainly a phenomenon that has greatly impacted on man since his earliest 
existence on earth. Man continues to live in awe of fire not so much because of 
the various ways in which energy from fire can be harnessed to serve him but 
more because of the destruction fire has wrought upon him. The development of 
fire science has accelerated over the last 150 years. It is a complex area involving 
many disciplines, but it is relatively primitive compared to other technological 
fields (Quintiere 1998). An example of this uncertainty is in the field of fire 
engineering, and specifically in structural fire design, where the effect of fire on 
the behaviour of the structural element is not yet fully understood or quantifiable. 
The effect on the whole structure is even less understood. The bulk of the 
lmowledge on structural response due to fire is largely empirical and is based on 
many assumptions and hypotheses. 
5.2.2.2 Physical Uncertainty 
Structural responses of a whole structure or components under fire condition 
depend in part on the material properties at elevated temperature. These properties 
are not lmown exactly and this gives rise to physical uncertainty. Physical 
uncertainty is that identified with the inherent random nature of a basic variable. 
Specific examples include; 
• The physical dimension of a structural member at elevated temperature 
• The fire temperature 
• Variation of the yield strength with temperature 
• Variability in the actual gravity loading during fire situation 
Physical uncertainty can be reduced but not eliminated with greater availability 
of data, or greater effort in quality control. It is a "fundamental" property of the 
basic variable. The physical uncertainty for any basic variable is generally not 
known a piori and must be estimated from observations of the variable or be 
subjectively assessed. 
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5.2.2.3 Statistical Uncertainty 
In most cases of engineering design, values of material properties used in 
calculation are inferred from statistical analyses of sample observations. Data may 
be collected for the purpose of building a probabilistic model of the physical 
variability of a property. This will involve, firstly the selection of an appropriate 
probability distribution type, and then the determination of numerical values for 
the parameters. Common probability distributions have between one and four 
parameters which immediately places a lower bound on the sample size required. 
But in practice, very large sample sizes are required to establish reliable estimates 
of the numerical values of the parameters. Therefore, for a given set of data the 
distribution parameters may themselves be considered as random variables, the 
uncertainty of which is dependent on the amount of sample data or any prior 
knowledge. This uncertainty is termed statistical uncertainty and, unlike physical 
uncertainty, arises solely as a result of lack of information. An example of such 
uncertainty in building construction for fire safety is the fire resistance rating of 
building components like pre-cast concrete beams and columns. 
5.2.2.4 Modelling Uncertainty 
Structural fire design and analysis sometime make use of mathematical models 
relating desired output quantities (e.g, the temperature of steel member) to the 
values of a set of input quantities or basic variables (e.g fuel load density, 
ventilation factors). These models are generally deterministic in form. 
Furthermore, they may be based on an intimate understanding of the mechanics of 
the problem (e.g. modes of heat transfer) or they may be highly empirical (e.g. 
parametric time-temperature relationship). However, with very few exceptions, it 
is rarely possible to make highly accurate predictions about the structural 
response of both the components and the whole structure under fire condition. In 
other words, the response of structural elements to fire and loading under fire 
condition contains a component of uncertainty in addition to those components 
arising from uncertainties in the values of the basic loading and strength variables. 
This additional source of uncertainty is termed modelling uncertainty and -occurs 
as a result of simplifying assumptions, unknown boundary conditions and also as 
a result of the unknown effects of other variables and their interaction which are 
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not included in the model. In many components and structures, model 
uncertainties have a large effect on structural reliability and should not be 
neglected (Thoft-Christensen & Baker 1982). 
5.2.2.5 Prediction Uncertainty 
Structural fire design involves the prediction of a future state of affair; for 
example, the prediction of the probability of fire occurring and the resulting 
structural response. The soundness of a prediction depends on the state of the 
available knowledge. As new knowledge related to the structural response under 
fire condition becomes available, the prediction and hence the design will become 
more refined, with, usually but not necessarily, a concomitant reduction in 
uncertainty. In other words, the accuracy of any prediction made is dependent not 
only on the properties of the structure, but also on the designer's knowledge of the 
structure and the forces and influences likely to act on it under fire condition. 
Similarly, if the structure is designed for a specific lifetime, the designer's 
uncertainty in the prediction of the structure's lifetime and the peak loading during 
this lifetime also add additional uncertainty to the overall process. 
5.2.2.6 Decision Uncertainty 
In structural fire design, or for that matter any design or undertaking, a series of 
decisions have to be made. Sound or correct decisions depend primarily on the 
elimination or reduction of all or most of the uncertainties described earlier. 
However, uncertainty will still arise in the decision making. An example of 
decision uncertainty is in connection with the decision whether, for example, a 
limit state has been violated. In the aftermath of a fire the engineer has to decide, 
based on certainty of his own engineering judgement or experience, whether the 
fire damaged structure is repairable, still serviceable or has violated the ultimate 
limit state. Another example is the choice of failure criterion for structural 
member exposed to fire - whether failure analysis should be done in the 
temperature, load bearing or time domains. 
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5.2.2. 7 Human Factors 
Arguably, it can be said that the greatest source of uncertainty in the design, 
construction, operation or usage, and maintenance of any engineering system 
comes from the "human factor". The uncertainty resulting from human 
involvement in engineering system normally manifest itself when the system fails 
and human error is determined to be the main cause. For example, human error 
causes 20-90% of all major system failures or accidents as data in Table 4-1 will 
illustrate (Stewart & Melchers 1997). 
Table 5-1 Proportion of System Failure due to Human Error 
Percentage of 
System failures/accident Source 
Aircraft 60-70% Christensen and Howard (1981) 
Air Traffic Control 90% Kinney et al. (1977) 
Building and bridges 75% Matousek and Schneider (1977) 
Dams 75% Loss and Kennett (1987) 
Missiles 20-53% Christensen And Howard (1981) 
Off-shore platforms 80% Bea (1989) 
Power plants: 
Fossil-fuel 20% Finnegan et al (1980) 
Nuclear 46% Scott and Gallaher (1979) 
Shipping 80% Gardenier (1981) 
(From Stewart & Melchers 1997) 
Human error can be roughly classified into (a) gross human error and (b) error 
due to human variability (Melchers 1987). 
Gross human errors are a direct result of ignorance or oversight of fundamental 
structural or service requirement and is related more to the individual. The various 
factors associated with this category is shown in Table 4.2 
Table 5-2 Error Factors in Observed Failure Cases (Melchers 1987) 
Factor 
Ignorance, carelessness, negligence 
Forgetfulness, errors, mistakes 
Reliance on others without sufficient control 
Underestimation of influences 
Insufficient knowledge 
Objectively unknown situations (unimaginable?) 
Remaining 










Human error due to human variability is due to natural variation among the 
individuals with respect to ability, task performance and so on. The prime 
"causes" are shown in Table 4-3. 
Table 5-3 Prime "Causes" of Failure (Melchers 1987) 
Cause 
Inadequate appreciation of loading conditions or structural behavior 
Mistakes in drawings or calculation 
Inadequate information in contract documents or instructions 
Contravention of requirement in contract documents or instructions 
Inadequate execution of erection procedure 
Unforeseeable misuse, abuse and/or sabotage, catastrophe, 
deterioration ( partly "unimaginable" ?) 
Random variations in loading, structure, materials, workmanship, etc 
Others 
Adapted from Walker (1981) 
The overriding from these surveys is that human error is involved in the majority 











reliability assessment is to relate to reality. But, because of its complexity, human 
behaviour cannot yet be related to all the various factors that influence it.. 
5.3 OVERVIEW OF UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
The existence of various uncertainties, particularly in the inherent 
randomness of fire behaviour, is the main contributor to potential failure of 
structural fire design. The primary objective of uncertainty analysis is to 
assess the statistical properties, such as the probability density function 
(PDF) and the statistical moments of a quantity subject to uncertainty. The 
knowledge of such statistical information is essential in reliability analysis. 
In other words, uncertainty analysis is a prerequisite for reliability analysis. 
5.3.1 Different Measures of Uncertainties 
Several expressions have been proposed to describe the degree of 
uncertainty of a parameter, a function, a model, or a system. The latter three 
usually depend on a number of parameters. Therefore their uncetiainty is a 
weighted combination of the uncertainties of the contributing parameters. 
The most complete and ideal description of uncertainty is the probability 
density function (PDF) of the quantity subject to uncertainty. However, in 
most practical problems such a probability function cannot be derived or 
found precisely (Ang & Tang 1975). 
Another method of expressing the uncertainty of a quantity is to describe it 
in terms of a reliability domain such as the confidence interval. The 
methods of evaluating the confidence interval of a parameter on the basis of 
data samples are well known and can be found in standard statistics and 
probability reference books (e.g. Benjamin & Comell1970). Nevertheless, 
this method of confidence interval has a few drawbacks, including (a) the 
parameter population may not be normally distributed as assumed in the 
conventional procedures to determine the confidence interval, and this 
problem is important when the sample size is small; (b) there exists no 
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means to combine directly the confidence intervals of individual 
contributing random components to give the confidence interval of the 
system as a whole (Ang & Tang 1984). 
A useful alternative is to quantify the level of uncertainty is to use the 
statistical moments of the random variable. In particular, the second 
moment is a measure of the dispersion of a random variable, and either the 
variance or standard deviation can be used. The coefficient of variation, 
which is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean offers a normalised 
measure useful and convenient for comparison and for combining 
uncertainties of different variables. 
5.3.2 Methods of Uncertainty Analysis 
Methods for performing uncertainty analysis vary in different level of 
sophistication. They are also dictated by the information available regarding 
the stochastic input parameters. In principle, it would be most ideal to 
derive the exact probability distribution of the model output as function of 
those of the stochastic input parameters. However, most of the models or 
design procedures used in fire engineering are nonlinear and highly 
complex. This prohibits any attempt to derive the probability distribution of 
model output analytically. As a practical alternative, engineers frequently 
resort to methods that yield approximations to the statistical properties of 
uncertain model outputs. Some of the methods that can and have been used 
in uncertainty analysis are very briefly mentioned below. 
5.3.2.1 First-Order Variance Estimation Method 
This method estimates uncertainty in terms of the variance of system output 
using the variances of the individual contributing factors. This method 
needs only the mean and standard deviation of the stochastic parameters 
involved in engineering models. Complete description of this method can be 
found in standard texts (e.g., Ang & Tang 1975, Benjamin &Cornel11970). 
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5.3.2.2 Rosenblueth's Method 
Rosenblueth's (1975) method is based on a Taylor series expansion about 
the means of input variables. It can be used to estimate statistical moments 
of any order of a model output involving several stochastic input variables 
which are either correlated or uncorrelated. 
5.3.2.3 Integral Transformation Techniques 
The well known integral transforms are Fourier transform, Laplace 
transform and exponential transform. Use of the integral transform methods 
for uncertainty analysis requires knowledge about the PDF's of stochastic 
input parameters in the model. Tables of various integral transforms of 
functions can be found in many mathematical handbooks (e.g, Abramowitz 
and Stegun, 1972). 
5.3.2.4 Monte Carlo Simulation 
More detailed uncertainty analysis can be performed by Monte Carlo 
simulation. This technique, in principle, generates random values of 
stochastic input parameters according to their respective probabilistic 
characteristics. A large number of random parameter sets are generated to 
compute the corresponding model output. Then, analyses are performed 
upon the simulated model output to determine the statistical characteristics 
of the output such as the mean, variance, confidence interval and so on. 
In the past, the main disadvantage often noted for Monte Carlo simulation is 
its computational intensiveness. Although this is still an issue for complex 
systems, it is increasing less of a problem due to the ready availability of 
powerful high speed personal computers. In fact, commercial softwares for 
Monte Carlo simulation are now available. One of these software named 
@RISK is used for uncertainty and reliability analyses in this project. 
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6 RELIABILITY IN STRUCTURAL FIRE DESIGN 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The lesser established a technical discipline is - mainly because it of being a 
relatively new one - the more uncertainties there are associated with the existing 
body of knowledge. This can be said of the field of fire engineering. The various 
uncertainties related to structural fire design have been described in chapter 4. 
The pertinent question here is, given all the uncertainties as described therein, 
how reliable is a structural fire design? Or, if the structure has been erected, what 
is the structural reliability of the building under the condition for which it has 
been designed- fire in this case? In more plain language, the question is, how 
stable is the building or what is the probability of collapse of the whole or part of 
the structure in the event that a fully developed broke out inside the building? To 
answer these questions, recourse has to be made to another relatively new 
discipline- reliability analysis. 
6.2 THE CONCEPT OF RELIABILITY 
In the broadest sense, reliability is associated with dependability, with successful 
operation, and with the absence of breakdowns or failures. However, in 
engineering analysis it is necessary to define reliability quantitatively in terms of 
probability. Thus reliability is defined as the probability that a system will 
perform its intended function for a specified period of time under a given set of 
conditions (Lewis 1994). "System" can refer to any product or processes like 
equipment, a building, sub-systems, components and parts. 
A product or system is said to fail when it ceases to perform its intended function. 
When there is total cessation of function - an engine stops running, or a structure 
collapses- the system has clearly failed. Often, however, it is necessary to define 
failure quantitatively in order to take into account the more subtle forms of failure 
through deterioration or instability of function. Thus a motor that is no longer 
capable of delivering a specified torque or a structure that exceeds a specified 
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deflection has failed. The choice of failure criteria is often arbitrary. So there is a 
need for consistency. 
6.3 THE BASIC RELIABILITY PROBLEM 
In structural fire design the problem of reliability may be cast as a problem of 
"capacity versus demand." Here, we are concerned that the fire resistance 
(capacity) of a building element (structural or otherwise) is sufficient to withstand 
the fire severity (demand) in a room. That is, the capacity must always be greater 
than the demand. The question of reliability arises because the determination of 
the available capacity (fire resistance) and the maximum demand (worst fire 
severity) are not simple or exact problems. Estimation and prediction are 
invariably necessary for these purposes; in the process, uncertainties are 
unavoidable for the simple reason that engineering information is incomplete. In 
order to explicitly represent or reflect the significance of uncertainty, the available 
capacity and demand may be modelled as random variables. In these terms, the 
reliability of the system may be realistically measured in term of probability. For 
this purpose, we define the following random variables: 
R =Fire Resistance (Capacity) 
S = Fire Severity (Demand) 
M = Safety Margin defined as M = R- S 
The equation M = R - S is also known as the limit state function and can be 
denoted by G(R,S). The objective of a reliability-based design is to ensure that 
given the outbreak of any fire the event (M > 0) or G(R,S) >0 occurs throughout 
the useful or specified life of the building. This assurance is only possible in term 
of the probability P(M > 0). This probability therefore represents a realistic 
measure of the reliability of the system. Conversely, the probability of the 
complimentary event (R ::::; S) or (M ::::; 0) is the corresponding measure of 
unreliability or failure of the design. 
The probability of failure Pr is thus expressed as: 
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Pr= P(R- S:::::; 0) = P(M:::::; 0) (6.1) 
If the necessary probability density functions of R and S are available or can be 
approximated, that is fR(r) and fs(s) are known, and if R and S are continuous 
random variables which are statistically independent, the probability of failure Pr 
may then be expressed as follows: 
P1 = P(R -S:::::; 0) = [ r:' fn(r)fs(s)drds (6.2) 





Figure 6-1 Basic Reliability Problem Represented by PDF ofR and S 
1.0 
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In statistical theory, for any random variable X, the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF), Fx(x) is given by equation (6.3), provided that x :::: y. (Ang & 
Tang 1975) 
Fx(x) = P(X ~ x) = [fx(y)dy (6.3) 
Equation (6.2) can then be written in the form: 
(6.4) 
The integral in equation (6.4) is known as a "convolution integral" and is easier to 
solve than equation (6.2). The meaning of equation (6.4) can best be explained by 
reference to Fig.6.2. 
FR(x), fs(x) 
P(R~x) R=x 
fs(x)dx = limP[x ~ s ~ x+L1x] 
(L1x~O) 
X 
Fig. 6.2 Reliability Problem Represented by PDF of S and CDF of R 
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FR(x) is the probability that R ~ x, or the probability that the actual fire resistance 
R of the element is less than some value x. Let this represent failure. The term 
fs(x)dx represents the probability that the fire severity has a value between x and 
x + ~x in the limit as ~x---+0. By considering all possible values of x, that is, by 
taking the integral over all x, the total probability of failure is obtained. 
The lower limit of integration shown in equation (6.2) and (6.4) may not be 
totally satisfactory, since a "negative" fire resistance is not usually possible. The 
lower limit of integration should strictly be zero, although this may be 
inconvenient and slightly inaccurate if R and S are modelled by distributions 
unlimited in the lower tail (such as the normal distribution). The inaccuracy arises 
strictly from the choice of distribution for R and S, and not from the theory 
involved with the equations (6.2)- (6.4). 
6.3.1 Special Case: Normal Random Variables 
When R and S are normal random variables with means J-LR and J-Ls and variances 
crR2 and crl respectively, the random variable M is also normal with a mean and 
variance given by: 
J-LM = J-LR - J-Ls 
2 2 2 
crM = crR + crs 




Where <D is the standard normal distribution function (zero mean and unit 




Where f3 is defined as the reliability index or safety index. From equation (6.8) it 
can be seen that as the difference between the mean of the fire resistance and the 
fire severity is reduced, the value of f3 decreases and Pf increases. Similarly, when 
either crR or crs or both are increased, f3 will decrease, with corresponding increase 
in Pf. The probability density of the random variable M, denoted by fM(m), and 
the "physical" meaning of f3 is illustrated in Fig.6.3. 
Failure Safety 
pf 
0 J.!M m 
Fig. 6.3 Probability Density Function of the Safety Margin M 
As shown in Fig.6.3, f3 is simply a measure (in units of standard deviation crM) of 
the distance that the mean J..tM is away from the origin m = 0. This point marks the 
boundary to the "failure region". Hence f3 is a direct measure of the safety of the 
structural element and greater f3 represents greater safety, or lower probability of 
failure. 
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6.4 METHODS OF RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
6.4.1 Preliminary 
In the preceding sections, the basic reliability problem has been formulated and 
mathematical equations derived for calculating the total probability of failure. 
Thus, to determine the reliability of this "capacity-demand" problem, one only 
needs to evaluate the "convolution integral" shown in equation (6.4) to obtain the 
total probability of failure. The probability of non-failure or safe performance is a 
direct measure of reliability. However, in reality, the problem is generally not as 
simple as described earlier. First of all, closed form integration of equation (6.2) 
or (6.4) is only possible for some special cases, for example, when both RandS 
are normal random variables. In general, recourse must be made to numerical 
integration. Secondly, the simplified formulation of equation (6.4) is not sufficient 
for many real life problems. Usually several random variables will influence the 
capacity or resistance. 
It follows that in general the resistance or capacity of a system is a vector function 
of various parameters. If the vector X represents the basic variables of the 
problem, then the limit state equation G(R,S) = R - S = 0 can be generalised as 
G(X) = 0. Consequently, equation (6.2) can be generalised as: 
P1 = P[G(X) s 0] = f..... ffx(x)dx (6.9) 
G(X)~O 
Here, fx(x) is the joint probability density function for the n vector X of basic 
variables. 
Equation (6.9) adds considerably to the complexity of the calculation of failure 
probability. While numerical integration may be possible for very small number 
(less than 5) of random variables, the problem is considered not feasible to be 
solved analytically even on computers (Stewart & Melchers 1997). However, 
techniques have been developed to handle these problems. Two broad classes of 
the more commonly used techniques are the First Order Second Moment methods 
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and the Monte Carlo Simulation method. These are briefly described below and 
their suitability for assessing reliability of structural fire design would be 
discussed. 
6.4.2 First Order Second Moment Method 
In the First Order Second Moment (FOSM) method the terminology 'second 
moment' refers to the description of all the random variables in terms only of their 
mean (the 'first moment') and their variance (the 'second moment'). The normal 
distribution is adequately specified by these two 'moments' and for simplicity and 
applications one could read 'second moment' methods simply as performing 
calculations only with normal distributions. It does not mean that the method does 
not apply to non-normal distributions - its application merely implies that 
whatever the distribution attached to a random variable, only the first two 
moments are considered are considered for calculation. Higher moments, which 
might describe the skew and flatness of the distribution are ignored. 
The term "first order" defines the expression for the failure condition or limit state 
function as a linear function. In section 6.3 above, the limit state function G(R,S) 
was given by M = R- S which is clearly linear. The probability of failure Pr is 
given by; 
(6.10) 
Where f3 is the reliability index or safety index and <I> is the standard normal 
distribution. Pr, as defined above, is the exact probability of failure if both R and 
S are normally distributed. For other distributions of Rand S, both the random 
variables and the original problem must be transformed to the standard normal 
space - a process which requires, in the general case, the use of the Rosenblatt 
(1952) transformation. Then the Pr determined as defined in (6.10) is only the 
nominal failure probability. Consequently, the conventional practice for such 
cases 1s not to refer to failure probability at all, but to f3, the safety index 
(Melchers, 1987). 
A further complication arises when there are more than two random variables or 
where the limit state function is a composite of several components such as 
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denoted by equation (6.9). Also, the limit state function is likely to be non-linear. 
In the FOSM method the non-linear function, say G(X), is linearised through a 
first order Taylor's series expansion about an appropriately chosen point, say x*. 
By truncating the series at linear terms, the approximate first order mean (l!x) and 
variance (crx2), in form of algebraic expression, are then obtained. The expression 
for the safety index is then given by: 
fJ _fix * -X 
(Jx 
The subscript for p means that its value depends on the choice of the expansion 
point x*. 
The foregoing is just a very brief introduction to the FOSM method of reliability 
analysis. It has to be appreciated that usage of this method entails: 
• an accurate formulation of the limit state function, 
• transformation (e.g by Rosenblatt transformation), ifnecessary, to equivalent 
normal distribution, 
• linearisation of non-linear function by Taylor senes expansiOn about an 
appropriate point. 
• application of an iterative procedure or an algorithm in a computer software in 
order to arrive at a most accurate value of the safety index p. 
FOSM methods are extensively used in reliability analysis of various engineering 
systems, including civil engineering structure at normal temperature. The main 
reason for the wide application of FOSM method in these more established areas 
is the availability of properly formulated limit state functions. This method is 
also applicable in fire engineering to assess the reliability of different aspects of 
fire safety design, including structural fire design. However, these methods have 
the following disadvantages: 
• the 'design' or 'checking' point must be accurately identified for each limit 
state function, in order to obtain a sensible value of p, 
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• non-linear limit state functions are not easily handled and may give rise to 
. . 
maccurac1es, 
• the transformation of non-normal distributions to equivalent normal 
distributions is very difficult, especially if the random variables are correlated. 
A more suitable method for assessing the reliability of structural fire design is 
described in the next section. 
6.4.3 The Method of Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation techniques involve "sampling" at "random" to simulate 
artificially a large number of experiments and to observe the results. In the case of 
analysis for any structural reliability, with problem type as defined by equation 
(6.9), this means sampling each random variable Xi randomly to give a sample 
value Xi. The limit state function G(x) s; 0 is then checked. If the limit state 
function is violated, that is the structure or structural element has "failed", this 
event is counted and recorded. The experiment is repeated many times, each time 
with a randomly chosen vector x of Xi value. If N trials are conducted, the 
probability of failure is given approximately by: 
p = n(G s; 0) 
I N 
Where n(G s; 0) is the number of trials for which G s; 0 or failure occurred. 
Obviously the number N of trials required is related to the desired accuracy for Pf. 
In other words, in the Monte Carlo method a game of chance is constructed from 
known probabilistic properties in order to solve the problem many times over, and 
from that to deduce the required result ( e.g. the failure probability). 
To apply Monte Carlo techniques to practical problems the following broad 
outline of procedures are required (Melchers, 1987): 
• to develop systematic methods for random and numerical "sampling" of the 
basic variable X; 
• to select an appropriate economical and reliable simulation technique; 
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• to consider the effect of the complexity of calculating G(X) and the number of 
basic variables on the simulation technique used; 
• for a given simulation technique to be able to determine the amount of 
"sampling" required to obtain a reasonable estimate ofPr. 
• to account for correlation or dependence between all or some of the random 
variables in the model 
The above stated procedures are for setting up a model for Monte Carlo 
simulation analytically, and the mathematics involved can be as difficult as that 
for the FOSM method. After setting up the model, the actual multiple runs have to 
be done on a computer in order to obtain more accurate results. In the past, lack of 
computer capability had limited the use of Monte Carlo simulation (Stewart & 
Melchers 1997). This is not an issue now. In fact several computer software are 
now commercially available to enable Monte Carlo simulation to be carried out 
on any reasonably high speed and capacity personal computer. Use of commercial 
software for Monte Carlo simulations has greatly enhanced quantified risk 
assessment and has the following advantages (Vose, 1996): 
• the distributions of the model's variables do not have to be approximated in 
any way (items can be selected from the software's menu) 
• correlation and other inter-dependencies can be modelled 
• the level of mathematics required to use Monte Carlo simulation software is 
quite basic (compared to the analytical approach) 
• greater level of precision can be achieved by simply increasing the number of 
iterations on the computer 
• changes to the model can be made very quickly and the results compared with 
the previous models. 
• The computer does all of the work required in determining the probability 
distribution function of any desired outcome. 
• Monte Carlo simulation is widely recognised as a valid technique so its results 
are more likely to be accepted. 
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A number of software package are commercially available to carry out risk 
analysis in general and some of those that are add-ins to spreadsheet suitable for 
setting up a model for Monte Carlo simulation are as follows: 
(i) @RISK Software 
@RISK software (Palisade 1995), originally developed for use with Lotus 1-2-3 
is also available for the Excel spreadsheet. It has very sophisticated set of features 
but remains easy to use. 
(ii) Crystal Ball 
Crystal Ball (Decisioneering 199?) has a lot of features in common with @RISK 
but lacks some its sophistication. 
(iii) Predict! 
Predict! (Risk Decision199?) is a stand-alone product with its own spreadsheet. It 
uses a different format for its formulae and lacks a lot of the sophistication of 
modem spreadsheet that @RISK and Crystal Ball capitalise on. 
@RISK will be the software used to carry out reliability analysis in the two case 
studies described in chapter 7 and 8 of this report. A brief description of the 
@RISK software follows in the next section. 
6.4.4 Description of @RISK Software 
@RISK software is an "add-in" to Microsoft Excel or Lotus 1-2-3 for window 
spreadsheet programs. This software brings advanced modelling and risk analysis 
capability to these two spreadsheet program. 
@RISK uses the technique of Monte Carlo simulation for risk analysis. With this 
technique, uncertain input values in the spreadsheet are specified as probability 
distributions. There are more than 30 probability distributions to choose from 
@RISK's menu- ranging from the Beta to the Weibull distribution. Distribution 
functions can be added to any number of cells and formula throughout the 
worksheets and can include arguments which are cell references and expressions, 
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thus allowing extremely sophisticated specification of uncertainty. Other options 
available for controlling and executing a simulation in @RISK are: 
• Latin Hypercube or Monte Carlo sampling 
• Any number of iterations per simulation 
• Any number of simulations in a single analysis 
• Continuing a simulation after viewing results and performing more iterations 
if necessary 
• Seeding the random number generator 
@RISK graphs an approximation to probability distribution of possible results 
for each output cell selected in the spreadsheet. Other graphics include: 
• Relative frequency distributions and cumulative probability curves 
• Summary graphs for multiple distributions across cell ranges (a worksheet 
row or column) 
• Statistical reports on generated distributions 
• Probability of occurrence for target values in a distribution 
• Export of graphics as window metafiles for further enhancement. 
Risk analysis in @RISK is a quantitative method that seeks to determine 
outcomes of a decision situation as a probability distribution. In general, 
techniques in an @RISK risk analysis encompass four steps: 
(i) Developing a model - by defining the problem or situation in Excel or 
Lotus 1-2-3 format 
(ii) Identifying Uncertainties - of variables in the work sheets and specifying 
their possible values with probability distributions, and identifying the 
uncertain work sheet results that require analysis. 
(iii) Analysing the Model with Simulation - to determine the range and 
probabilities of all possible outcomes for the results of the work sheets 
(iv) Making a Decision - based on the results provided and personal 
preferences 
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@RISK helps with the first three steps, by providing a powerful and flexible tool 
that works with Excel or 1-2-3 to facilitate model building and risk analysis. The 
results that @RISK generates can then be used by the decision maker to choose a 
course of action. 
For a more comprehensive description of the @RISK program, readers are 
advised to consult the @RISK users annual (Palisade 1995) 




In structural fire design, critical building components like structural beams, 
columns, walls, floors and doors are designed to have fire resistance rating. The 
design consideration is that the fire resistance rating should be more than 
sufficient to withstand the worst fire severity expected in the building. The 
methodologies for quantifying both the fire resistance and fire severity have been 
explained in chapter 2. If a building had been designed for fire safety the "design 
fire resistance" of a building component is normally calculated based on the 
"design fire severity" in a fire compartment. But in many cases building 
components are not designed with fire resistance as the primary concern. 
However, this does not mean that such components are not fire resistant at all. 
The fire resistance of these building components can still be assessed by 
calculation or by applying empirical correlations, as explained in section 2.2 
The objective of this case study is to assess the reliability of applying empirical 
correlations for determining the fire resistance of a building component and the 
fire severity, given the outbreak of a fully developed fire in the room. The 
building element selected for assessment is a monolithic concrete slab. 
7.2 Structural Performance of a Monolithic Concrete Slab 
Under Fire Condition -Deterministic Calculation 
7.2.1 Fire Compartment Data 
The structural performance under fire condition of a monolithic concrete slab, 
which forms the floor of a compartment, would be assessed here. Data related to 
the fire compartment are as follows: 
Room depth: 7m 
Room width: 5m 
Room height: 2.5m 
Height ofwindow: 1.5m 
Width ofwindow: 3.5m 
Internal surface lining material: All concrete construction 
Fuel load density: 800MJ/m2 [Hazard category 2 (BIA 1995)] 
7.2.2 Fire Resistance Rating of slab 
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The fire resistance of dry monolithic normal weight concrete slabs based on 
obtaining a failure temperature rise of 250°F at the unexposed surface is given by 




R 1 =the fire resistance of slab based on heat transmission criterion (hour) 
L =thickness of slab (ft) 
p = density of concrete (lb/ft3) 
c = specific heat of concrete (Btu/lb°F) 
k =thermal conductivity of concrete (Btu/ft h°F). 
If no data on the thermal properties of the concrete are available, the following 
conservative values may be used for these properties: 
k = 1.0 Btu/ft h°F (1.73/mK) for normal weight concrete 
k = 0.45 Btu/ft h°F (0.78W/mK) for lightweight concrete, and 
c = 0.20 Btu/lb°F (837.4JikgK) for both concretes. 
In this case equation (7 .1) becomes, for normal weight concrete: 




Where: F =Fire Resistance Rating (minutes) 
7.2.3 Fire Severity 
The Eurocode 1 formula (EC1 1994) for the time equivalence, te, for fire severity 
in a room is given by: 
where: 
te = kb w er (min) 
er is the fuel load (MJ/m2 of floor area) 
kb is a parameter to account for different compartment linings 
w is the ventilation factor given by 
W = (6.0)
03
[ 0.62 + 90(0.4 -avt J > O.S 
H,. 1+bvalt 
where: fL. is the compartment height (m) 
0.05 :::;; Cfvy:::;; 0.25 
ah =Ah/ Ar ah :::;; 0.20 
bv =12.5(1 + 10av -ac2) 
Ar is the floor area of the compartment (m2) 
Avis the area of vertical openings (m2) 
Ah is the area of horizontal openings (m2) 
7 .2.4 Limit State Equation 




Where M is the safety margin (min) 
7.2.5 Performance of slab 
For a concrete slab thickness of 0.33ft (4 in.) and with normal weight concrete 
density taken as 132 lb/ft3 (2200kg!m\ the fire resistance is given by: 
F = 1.8(132)1.2(0.33)1.85 min 
= 81 min. 
Based on the data from section 7.2.1, the following are obtained: 
Ventilation factor w = 1.26. 
With concrete as the room internal surface lining material, the thermal inertia 
:. Conversion factor kb = 0.055 (Buchanan 1994) 
The fire severity te = kb w er 
= (0.055)(1.26)(800) 
=55 min. 
The safety margin M = F - te 





The above deterministic calculation shows that, with a safety margin of 26 
minutes, the concrete slab's fire resistance rating is more than sufficient to 
withstand the expected fire severity in the room. 
7.3 Structural Reliability of Monolithic Concrete Slab Under 
Fire Condition 
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The detenninistic calculation of the safety margin has been carried out using a 
single value of the parameters involved. To assess the stmctural reliability of the 
slab under fire condition, variation in the values of all the parameters has to be 
accounted for. This can be done by carrying out Monte Carlo simulation on the 
@RISK software. The parameters for simulations are treated as random variables 
which take on a range of value defined by their respective probability distribution 
functions. The characterisation of the parameters as random variables are 
described below. 
(a) Room Depth 
Variation is mainly due to constmction and measurement errors. These errors are 
estimated to be in the order of 1%. The room depth is most realistically treated as 
a random variable which exhibits a triangular distribution. Triangular distribution 
is characterised by three parameters viz. the most likely value, a minimum and a 
maximum value. Both the minimum and maximum values have zero probability 
of occmTing. The nominal depth of 7.0m can be regarded as the most likely value. 
The addition and subtraction of 1% of the most likely value give the maximum 
value of 7.07m and a minimum value uf 6.93m respectively. 
(b) Room Width 
Similarly, the room width is treated as a random variable with triangular 
distribution. The most likely value is nominal width of 5.0m. The minimum value 
is 4.95 and the maximum value is 5.05m 
( c ) Room Height 
In the same manner, the room height exhibits a triangular distribution with a most 
likely value of2.50m, a minimum value of2.47m and a maximum of2.53m 
(d) Height of Window 
This is assumed to exhibit triangular distribution with a minimum value of 1.48m, 
a most likely value of 1.50m and a maximum value of 1.52m. 
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(e) Width of Window 
This is assumed to exhibit triangular distribution with a minimum value of 3 .46m, 
a most likely value of 3.5m and a maximum value of 3.54m. 
(f) Fuel Load Density 
A hazard category of 2 is assumed for this room and a fuel load density of 
800MJ/m2 of floor area is used in the deterministic spreadsheet calculation. This 
is the design value recommended in the Annex to Fire Safety Documents of the 
Approved Documents (BIA 1995b) for fire hazard category 2. However, this 
design value is the 80111 percentile fire load of the range of fire load density stated 
for the relevant fire hazard category. The variation in the fuel load density can be 
assumed to be nom1ally distributed with a coefficient of variation of 25% (CIB 
1986). As such, the mean value of the fuel load density is worked to be 
660MJ/m2· The standard deviation is therefore 165MJ/m2. 
(g) Compartment Lining Factor kL> 
The value of kb depends on the value of the thermal inertia ['/(kpc)] which, for 
concrete, can range fi·om a minimum value of around 420 J/m2Ks0·5 to a 
maximum value of around 2050 J/m2Ks0·5 . The value of kb can then range from 
around 0.055 to 0.07min.m2·3fMJ. The random variable kb is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a mean of 0.060 and a coefficient of variation of 0.10. 
The distribution is truncated with a minimum value of 0.055 and the maximum 
value of0.070 min.m2·3fMJ 
(h) Density of Concrete 
Density of concrete varies widely, depending on the aggregate mix, and can range 
from 120 lb/fe (1900kg/m3) to 157 lb/fe (2500kg/m3). A truncated normal 
distribution between these lower and upper values with a mean of 132 lb/ft3 
(2200kg/m3l and standard deviation of 7 lb/fe (11 Okg/m3) is assumed. 
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(i) Thickness of Concrete Slab 
The concrete slab thickness is expected to be uniform with any variation due to 
the casting process and shrinkage. The nominal thickness of the concrete slab is 
0.3333ft (4in), which can be regarded as the mean value of the assumed normal 
distribution of the slab thickness. The coefficient of variation is small and 
assumed to be 0.02. The truncated normal distribution is assumed to have a 
minimum value of 0.3133ft and a maximum value of 0.3533ft. The standard 
deviation is 0.0067ft .. 
7.3.1 Results of Simulation 
The Monte Carlo simulation using @RISK programme would generate relative 
frequency distributions of several outputs. The outputs' frequency distributions of 
interest are that for the safety margin, the fire resistance of the concrete slab and 
the fire severity in the room. The relative frequency distributions for the fire 
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Figure 7-1 very clearly illustrates the situation as that of a capacity demand 
problem. However, not much useful computation can be made from figure 7-1. 
In assessing the structural reliability of the concrete slab under fire condition, the 
output of interest is the probability of failure of the slab, that is, the probability of 
the value of the safety margin being less than or equal to zero. The probability of 
failure can be easily obtained from the cumulative distribution of the safety 
margin. @RISK has provision for reformatting frequency distribution into 
cumulative distribution. The cumulative distribution for the safety margin is 
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Figure 7-2 Cumulative Distribution of the Safety Margin 
In figure 7-2 the probability of failure, Pr, is the value of the point where the curve 
intersects the y-axis. In this particular case, the scale is too small for the value of 
intersect to be read off. Recourse has to be made to the data generated by @RISK 
which can be exported to the software's spreadsheet. Extract of the data are shown 
in Table 7-1. 
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Table 7 -1Extract from Spreadsheet Data for CDF of Safety Margin 
M Prob -6 2.03E-04 -1.5 1.28E-03 
-9.75 0 -5.5 2.90E-04 -1 1.47E-03 
-9.5 0 -5 3.81 E-04 -0.5 1.68E-03 
-9 0 -4.5 4.79E-04 0 1.91 E-03 
-8.5 0 -4 5.84E-04 0.5 2.18E-03 
-8 0 -3.5 6.99E-04 1 2.47E-03 
-7.5 0 -3 8.25E-04 1.5 2.81 E-03 
-7 4.00E-05 -2.5 9.62E-04 
-6.5 1.21 E-04 -2 1.11E-03 
From Table 7-1 the probability of failure of the concrete slab is 0.00191 or around 
0.2%. Assuming that the distribution of the safety margin is normal, this 
probability of failure corresponds to a value of the reliability index, ~'of 2.89. 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
This case study very clearly illustrates a situation whereby what appears to be a 
very safe design from deterministic calculation is not necessarily so when the 
reliability of the performance is assessed. On the other hand, the existence of even 
a small probability of failure does not mean that the calculation is not valid. What 
is more important is the question of what constitutes an acceptable probability of 
failure or what is the acceptable minimum reliability index? The answers to these 
questions should best be obtained from the national codes or regulatory 
documents. 
However, it should be mentioned that whilst most national codes do specify the 
acceptable reliability index for the ultimate .limit state due to normal gravity load, 
wind load, seismic load, and combination of loads, the same cannot be said for 
loading during fire. Be that as it may, it should also be appreciated that the 
acceptable probability of failure is normally calculated to be almost the absolute 
probability in the sense that almost all the uncertainties have to be accounted for. 
Thus, the main reason why acceptable probability of failure has not been specified 
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for structural reliability under fire condition is that there may exist too many 
uncertainties in most fire situations, which cannot be easily accounted for. 
In this case study, the probability of failure of slab is conditional upon the 
outbreak of a fully developed fire in the room. Of interest then is what is the 
probability of a fire becoming fully developed given certain probability of 
ignition or probability of flashover. Then there is probability of active protection 
system like sprinkler activating or the probability of successful intervention by the 
fire service to consider. The list can go on and if most of the events are 
independent, the near absolute or overall probability of failure of the concrete slab 
in fire situation, by applying the multiplication rule, would be reduced to 
practically zero. 
This does not mean that the conditional probability of failure is not useful. A 
better term for this conditional probability is "nominal" probability (Melchers 
1987). Nominal probability of failure is a very useful to indicate flaws or 
deficiency in a design or an existing building. In fact nominal measures of failure 
probability can be used as substitutes for more accurately determined measures if 
the effects of human error in particular are assumed to be similar for similar 
situations or structural components (Melchers 1987). 
An attempt at calculating the acceptable probability of failure for structural fire 
design is described in chapter 10. The reliability of perfmmance of the concrete 
slab will be fmiher assessed in that chapter. 


8 FIRE ENGINEERING DESIGN OF A STEEL 
FRAMED HOTEL BUILDING 
8.1 PRELIMINARY 
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In this chapter, a detailed description is given of a structural fire engineering design 
of a steel framed hotel building. The original fire engineering design was done by an 
engineering consultant firm with expertise in fire resistance of steel structures. To 
preserve confidentiality, the name of the designer, building owner and building name 
will not be referred to in this report. As the original design report could not possibly 
show all data or calculations used in the design process, a close approximation was 
made of the original design and calculations to show results which are as near as 
possible to the original results. 
8.1 OVERVIEW OF ORIGINAL DESIGN 
8.1.1 Building Description 
The fire engineering design was actually carried out on an extension to an existing 
hotel. The extension included a few additional floors of more than 100 rooms 
constructed on top of the existing building. The new structure is framed entirely 
in structural steel, with steel beams acting compositely with a concrete floor slab 
on profiled steel decking., Columns are all steel I section and the lateral load 
resisting system consists of both eccentrically-braced and moment-resisting 
frames. 
8.1.2 Design Philosophy 
The fire engineering design dealt only with the requirements for adequate fire 
resistance of the steel framed structure, which had been designed by an 
architectural and structural engineering consultant firm. Fire engineering analyses 
was employed to predict the behavior of natural or realistic fire in representative 
rooms and the structural responses of the structural elements in these rooms. The 
goal was to ascertain whether passive fire protections should be applied to the 
structural elements in order to achieve the required fire resistance or period of 
structural stability required by regulation. The whole analyses were performed on 
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the premise that active fire protection system like the sprinkler did not operate and 
there was no intervention by the fire services. 
8.1.3 Methods of Analysis and Results 
Based on the Eurocode I (EC1 1994) relationship for "real" fire, the air time 
temperature curves for a range of realistic natural fires in different fire 
compartments are obtained. These are used to calculate the maximum 
temperatures attained by the unprotected steel members, which are then compared 
with the limiting steel temperatures assessed in accordance with NZS 3404 Steel 
Structures Standard (SNZ 1997). The steel members are shielded from the direct 
effect of fire by the presence of a suspended "Gib-grid" ceiling system or Gib-
board wall chtddings. If the maximum steel temperature in a fire does not exceed 
the limiting steel temperature, then the beam or column continues to support the 
design loads throughout and after the fire. 
The fire engineering analyses show that the maximum temperatures that the steel 
members may reach in a "real" fire are less than the steel limiting temperature. 
The conclusion of the fire engineering design is that the steel beams and columns 
would continue to support their long-term design loads throughout and after a fire 
and therefore do not need any passive fire protection to meet the performance 
requirement of the New Zealand Building Code or any realistic requirements of 
the owner for satisfactory protection of the building and contents. 
8.2 PRESENT FIRE ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT 
8.2.1 Overview of Methodology 
The structural design process for fire resistance requires verification that the 
provided fire resistance exceeds the design fire severity. Verification may be in 
the time domain, the temperature domain or the strength domain. The time and 
the temperature domain will both be used in this project so that accuracy of both 
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can be compared. To carry out this verification it is first necessary to set up the 
fire model, heat transfer model and the structural response models. 
In the same manner as the original design, time-temperature curves for parametric 
fires in any room can be worked out on spreadsheets. These curves are used in 
spreadsheets to calculate the maximum steel temperatures attained by the beams 
or columns in the room. The spreadsheet calculation is based on the method by 
Gamble (1989) and Milke and Hill (1996). The structural steel members are not 
directly protected by sprayed on or encased protective material. The only form of 
protection is the presence of a monolithic 'Gib-grid' ceiling system using 12.5mm 
standard Gib-board which shields the steel beams and the 9 .Smm standard Gib-
board claddings which shield the steel columns. These ceilings and wall claddings 
were all conservatively assumed to fail 20 minutes after · flashover I and 
thence to fully expose the steel members to the hot gases. The time to failure of 
20 minutes for suspended ceiling and wall cladding are based on research carried 
out by BHP Research Melbourne Laboratories (Thomas et al 1993). With the 
ceiling and wall claddings in place, the steel members are treated as lightly 
insulated members and to be treated as unprotected when the insulation failed. 
Models are also set up for the case where the unprotected steel members, without 
the benefits of the shielding effect from the ceiling and wall claddings, are 
exposed to the fire and the case where the members are protected by sprayed on 
mineral fibre. The shielding effects of the ceiling and wall claddings are also 
ignored in the latter case. The detailed modelling and assessment are described 
below. 
8.2.2 Room and Steel Members' Dimensions 
In this design of an extension to a hotel, all four storeys of the extension consist of 
bedrooms and suites. No new kitchen, bar or function room are included. 
Dimensions of rooms, window and door openings and sizes of steel beams and 
columns are obtained from the architectural and structural drawings. A 
representative room, which is a comer room, is selected as a fire compartment for 
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assessment. An isometric view of the fire compartment showing the structural 
steel members in the compartment is shown in Fig. 8.1. 
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Beam Size Column Size 
AB 460UB 74.6 AA' 310UC158 
EF/CD 310 UB 40.4 BB' 310 uc 158 
AC 460UB 74.6 CC' 310 uc 137 
BD 460UB 74.6 DD' 310 uc 137 
Figure 8-1 Isometric View of Fire Compartment showing the Steel Members 
Before carrying out fire engineering assessment for structural stability under fire 
situation it is necessary to assess the structural members' performance under 
ambient condition. In this case, ambient condition means the building is subject 
only to gravity loading at normal working temperature. No account is made for 
wind, seismic and snow loading. This is considered justified because under fire 
situation the probability of other extreme loads occurring together with gravity 
load is very low (Turkstra 1970). 
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8.2.3 Structural Performance under Ambient Condition 
8.2.3.1 Design Action on Steel Members 
The steel members are shown in Fig.8-l. For the steel beams the design action is 
the maximum bending moment resulting from the combination of loads. The 
design action on steel columns is the compressive load imposed on the columns. 
These steel members have been designed for combination of gravity, wind and 
seismic loads. In assessing their performance under both ambient and fire 
conditions, only gravity loads are considered. 
8.2.3.2 Design Gravity Loading 
With reference to Fig.8.1 the following data are used for load calculation: 
Floor: 8.44m depth; 3.58m width; 0.130m concrete slab thickness 
Tributary area, Ar, for supporting beam= 8.44 x 3.58/2 = 15.11m2 
Density of concrete = 2200kg/m3 
The dead load, G, due to the weight of concrete slab, weight of walls and self 
weight of steel beams are worked out below: 
Weight of concrete slab = 0.130 x 22 kPa = 2.86kPa 
Weight of partitions, etc= 0.50 kPa 
Selfweight of310UB 40 beam = 0.40 kN/m 
= 0.40 /(3.58/2) kPa 
= 0.22 kPa 
Therefore, dead load, Q = 2.86 + 0.50 +0.22 = 3.58 kPa 
From NZS4203 ( SNZ:
1
1992), the basic live load, Qb, is taken to be 2 kPa. (for 
bedroom-institutional). 
Area reduction factor,\jfa, is given by 1.0;:::: \jfa = 0.4 + 2.7/"'At 
that is, \jfa = 0.4 + 2.7/"'15.11 = 1.09 
Therefore 'Va = 1.0 
The live load, Q = 'Va Qb , is therefore 2.0 kPa. 
The load combination for the ultimate limit state is given by: 
Lu = 1.2G + 1.6Q (8.1) 
Therefore, Lu = 1.2(3.58) + 1.6(2.0) = 7.50 kPa 
8.2.3.3 Performance of Beam 
The combined load per unit length ofbeam, w, = 7.50 x 3.58/2 kN/m 
= 13.43 kN/m 
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To be conservative, the steel beam is assumed to be simply supported. The 




Therefore M = 13.43(8.44i/8 = 119.58 kNm 
(8.2) 
Assuming that the structural steel is made from grade 300 steel, with a yield stress 
<Jy of 320MPa, the required plastic section modulus, Zp, for the case of plastic 
collapse of the beam, with the formation of a single plastic hinge at the centre is 
given by: 
Therefore, the required plastic section modulus, Zp = 119 .58/320x1 03 m3 
= 373.7 x 103 mm3 
(8.3) 
The 310 UB 40.4 beam has a nominal plastic modulus of 633 x 103 mm3 about the 
principal x axis. Applying a strength reduction factor, ~ = 0.9, the beam capacity 
is 570 x 103 mm3 which is adequate. Similar analysis is carried out for other beam 
in the room and the results tabulated in Table 8.1. 
This analysis ignores any composite action between the steel beam and the concrete 
slab. 
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Table 8-lPerformance of Beams under Normal Condition 
Required Zp Provided <P_Ze \ 
Steel Beam & Section (103 mm3) (103mm3) Remark 
EF: 310 UB 40.4 373.7 57o I ok 
AB: 460 UB 74.6 366 1494 ok 
AC: 460 UB 74.6 317 1494 ok 
BD: 460 UB 74.6 159 1494 ok 
8.2.3.4 Performance of Columns 
The room shown in Fig. 8-1 is one of several rooms of same design in one of the 
floors of the. 4 storeys extension to an existing building. As indicated in the 
architectural drawings, the same column sizes are used throughout the 4 storeys. 
In this analysis, columns on the lowest floor are considered so that the imposed 
load is a total from the three storeys above and the roof. The dead load imposed 
by the roof is assumed to be half that imposed by one floor. 
Interior Gravity Column (Column CC') 
Tributary area ( exluding roof), At, = 3 { 8.44 x 2.5(3.58)} m2 
=227m2 
Area reduction factor, \jfa, = 0.4 + 2.7/"-/At 
Roof Data 
= 0.4 + 2.7/"-/227 
=0.58 
Tributary area = 8.44 x 2.5(3.58) 
= 75.5 m2 
'Va = 0.4 ~ 2.7/"-/75.5 
=0.71 
From Table 3.4.1 of NZS 4203:1992 the basic live load, Qb, is taken as 0.25 kPa 
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Loading on Column 
Design gravity load on interior column, CC', N* g, is calculated as: 
N*g = [1.2x3.58 +1.6 X 0.58 X 2.0]227 + [1.2 X 0.5 X 3.58 + 1.6 X 0.71 X 0.25]75.5 
=1580kN 
Using design criteria : 
(8.4) 
where Ncy is the nominal member capacity for buckling about minor principal y 
axis, the following result is obtained: 
<J>Ncy :2 1580 
or, taking <j> = 0.9, Ncy = 1756 kN 
Actual column size: 310 UC 158 
• Actual length, L, = 4.5m 
• End restraint condition: One end translation and rotation fixed; other end 
translation fixed, rotation free. 
From NZS 3404 (SNZ1997) and BHP (1998), the following are obtained: 
• Effective length factor, ke, = 0.85 
• Form factor, kf, = 1.0 
• Net area of cross section, An= 20100 mm2 [assuming An= Ag (gross area of 
cross section)] 
• Yield stress, flange, (grade 300 steel), cry = 280 MPa 
• Radius of gyration about minor principal y axis (ry) = 78.9 mm 
Effective length of column, Le = ke L 
= 0.85 X 4.5 
= 3.83 m 
Nominal section capacity, N8 , = kf An cry 
= 1.0 X 20100 X 10"6 X 280 X 103 
= 5628 kN 
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Nominal member capacity, Nc, = <Xc Ns 
Where <Xc is the member slenderness 
reduction factor. 
The values of <Xc can be obtained from Table 6.3.3(2) of NZS 3404:Part 1:1997 
using the value of the modified member slenderness (An) and the appropriate 
member section constant (<Xb) given in Table 6.3.3(1) of the same Standard. 
The modified member slenderness (An) is given by the following equation: 
A, = (Le J r;:- F(jy J 
n r ;v•vtvl~) (8.5) 
Therefore, for this particular column, the value of An is given by: 
A, =( 3.83 LIU) r280J 
II 0.0789 r~·~~l~) 
= 51.4 
From Table 6.3.3(1) of NZS 3404:Part 1:1997, for universal column and beam, 
hot rolled, flange thickness up to 40 mm and kf = 1.0, the value of <Xb = 0. 
From Table 6.3.3(2) ofNZS 3404:Part 1:1997, for An= 51.4 and <Xb = 0, the value 
of <Xc = 0.854. 
The nominal member capacity of the column, Ncy = <Xc Ns 
= 0.854 X 5628 kN 
=4806kN 
From the above it can be seen that the selected column (310 UC 158) has a 
nominal member capacity ( 4806 kN) which is much greater than the required 
nominal member capacity (1756 kN) under the design gravity loading condition .. 
The same analysis is done for other beams in the fire compartment and the results 
tabulated in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8-2 Performance of Columns under Normal Condition 
Nominal member Required nominal Remark 
Column capacity (kN) capacity (kN) 
CC" :310 UC 137 4175 1756 ok 
(interior) 
DD' :310 UC 137 4175 1232 ok 
(edge) 
AA' :310 UC 158 4806 1224 ok 
(edge) 
BB' :310 UC 158 4805 670 ok 
(comer) 
Evaluation of structural members performance under gravity loading at normal 
temperature show that these members have been more than adequately designed 
for such loading. It is now necessary to evaluate similar performance under fire 
condition. 
8.2.4 Structural Response under Fire Condition 
A fully developed fire in a building is now regarded as an ultimate limit state 
event in structural design. Clause 2.4.3.4 (a) ofNZS 4203:1992 states that for that 
period of time during fire emergency conditions when the structure is subject to 
elevated temperature and designated members are required to remain stable, the 
affected members shall be designed for the following combination of factored 
load: 
Lu =G+ Qu (8.6) 
This load combination is to be used in structural analysis to ensure that all 
members and coru1ections shall have the design capacities that satisfy the ultimate 
limit state equation: 
(8.7) 
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Where (for structural fire design): 
S* is the design action for the load combination G + Qu 
during fire emergency situations. 
~Ru is the design capacity of the member at elevated 
temperature 
8.2.4.1 Temperature Domain Analysis 
The difficulty encountered in calculating the design capacity of the member at 
elevated temperature ( ~Ru) is that the temperature attained by the member has to 
be determined first, and the material properties at this temperature should be 
known. To add to the difficulty, it is known that under fire condition both the 
material temperature and properties vary with the fire severity. However, it is also 
known that for a member acted upon by a fixed load value, there exists a critical 
material temperature beyond which the member is not able to support this fixed 
value of load. This critical temperature is also called the limiting temperature. 
Hence, a limit state equation that satisfies the global limit state equation is of the 
form: 
(8.8) 
Where (for structural fire design): 
T* is the maximum temperature calculated to be attained by steel member 
under the fire condition with passive protection (if any). 
T1 is the limiting steel temperature under load condition for fire 
This will be the basis of the temperature domain analysis of the structural 
performance of the steel members under fire condition. 
8.2.4.2 Time Domain Analysis 
Performance of building element can also be analysed in the time domain under 
the concept of fire resistance rating. The fire resistance rating for the steel 
members will not be used here because they are unknown or are not provided by 
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the manufacturers. Instead the fire resistance rating is defined here as the "time to 
reach limiting temperature." The "time to reach limiting temperature" can be 
compared with the "time equivalence for fire severity" to obtain the limit state 
equation: 
where: t1 is the time to reach limiting temperature (fire resistance) 
te is the time equivalence (fire severity) 
(8.9) 
To carry out the analyses under both the temperature and the time domains it is 
necessary to set up the fire model, the heat transfer model and the structural 
response model. These are described in the following sections. 
8.2.5 The Fire Model 
8.2.5.1 Parametric Fire Time Temperature Curves 
The parameters used determination of the Eurocode parametric fire are shown in 
Table 8-3. 
Table 8-3 Parameters Used for Modeling Parametric Fire 
Parameters Values 
Room Depth (m) 8.44 
Room Width (m) 3.58 
Room Height (m) 2.40 
Area ofVertical Openings (m£) 4.30 
Weighted Average Height ofVertical Openings (m) 1.54 
Thermal Inertia of Lining Material (J/m£Ksu.::>) 1160 
Fuel Load Density (MJ/m£ floor area) 400 
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Explanatory Notes 
• The room height is the height to ceiling and is used for calculating the total 
internal surface area of the room 
• The vertical openings include the windows and doors to corridor and balcony 
• The thermal inertia of lining material, b, is assumed to be equal to 1160 
J/m2Ks0·5, which is considered reasonable for small enclosures with walls 
lined primarily by drywall gypsum board, HERA (1995) 
• The fuel load density of 400MJ/m2 (floor area) is the same as the value given 
in Acceptable Solution C3/ AS 1, for Fire Hazard Category 1, which includes 
hotel, BIA (1995) 
The Eurocode (EC1 1994) gives an equation for "parametric" fire, allowing a 
time-temperature relationship to be produced for any combination of fuel load, 
ventilation openings and wall lining materials. 
The time-temperature curve in the heating phase, from t* = 0 to t* = td*, is given 
by: 
Sg = 1325(1 - 0.324e-o.zt*- 0.204e-l.?t*- 0.472e-19t*) 
t*d = ( 0.13 X 10-3qt,dl )/Q 
Where; 
Sg air temperature in the fire compartment (0 C) 
t* t.r, fictitious time (h) 
t time (h) 
r (O/b)2/(0.04/1160i 
0 Av--fhiAt, the opening factor, such that 0.02:::;; 0:::;; 0.20 (mo.s) 
Av = area of vertical opening (m2) 
h weighted average height ofvertical opening (m) 
At total internal surface area of compartment, including openings (m2) 
b = --/(kpc ), thermal inertia of lining material, 
such that 1000 :::;; b :::;; 2000 (J/m2Ks0·5) 
k thermal conductivity oflining material (W/mK) 




c = specific heat capacity of lining material (J/kgK) 
qr,d = fuel load density based on compartment floor area (MJ/m2) 
qt,d = fuel load density (total internal surface area of compartment) (MJ/m2) 
The cooling phase is from t* > td* and the time-temperature curve in the cooling 
phase is given as: 
For td* :::;; 0.5 hours, 8g = 8max- 625(t* - td*) 




Where 8max = maximum air temperature in the heating phase (°C), for t* = td* 
8.2.5.2 Modified Cooling Phase (Buchanan) 
Buchanan (1999) stated that there are a lot of confusion regarding the Eurocode 
expression for the temperature decay or cooling phase because it is given in terms 
of fictitious time rather than real time. This appears to be a mistake because it 
gives extremely fast decay rates for large opening factors in well insulated 
compartments and extremely slow decay rates for small opening factors in poorly 
insulated compartments. The following decay rate related to real time is 
recommended: 
For td :::;; 0.5 hour, 
For td;::: 2 hours, 
d8g/dt = 625°C per hour 
d8gldt = 250°C per hour 
(8.15) 
(8.16) 
For 0.5 < td < 2 hours, linear interpolation can be carried out between the above 
Where: td, the heating duration in real time,= 0.00013qt,d/O (h). 
For the purpose of structural design it is recommended to use a decay rate d8gldt 
of 625°C per hour modified for opening factor and thermal insulation, given by 
d8g/dt = 625 (0/0.04)('/(kpcp)/1160) (8.17) 
These decay rates are based on some burning continuing in the decay phase, 
which is consistent with the duration in equation (8 .11) being less than the 
theoretical duration. 
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8.2.5.3 Modified Cooling Rate (HERA) 
The Eurocode expression for the cooling phase has also been modified by the 
New Zealand Heavy Engineering Research Association to more accurately 
represent experimental results (HERA 1995). The modified Eurocode expression, 
which gives a more conservative result than that obtained from the original 
expression, is given below. 
For 0.08 ~ 0 ~ 0.20 m0·5 
• Fort* = 1d* to t* = t*e=6ooac 
for td* ~ 0.5 hours, 8gcl = 8max - 625(t* - td*) 
for 0.5 < td* < 2 hours 8gc1 = 8max- 250(3 - td*)(t*- td*) 
for td* ;:::: 2 hours, 
where: 




t*e=6oooc = value oft* corresponding to 8gc = 600°C as determined from 
equations (1) to (3) above 
8max = maximum temperature in the heating phase (°C) 
• Fort* = t*e=600°C tot* = t*e=4oooc 
where: 
8gc2 = 600 - 7080 O(t* - t*e=6oooc)/1 (iv) 
t*e=6oooc = as defined above 
t*e=4oooc = value oft* corresponding to 8gc = 400°C as determined from 
equation (4) above 
Fort*= t*e=4ooac tot*= t*e=250°C 
where: 
8gc3 = 400- 1680 O(t* - t*e=4oooc)ll (v) 
t*e=4oooc = as defined above 
t*e=2sooc = value oft* corresponding to 8gc = 250°C as determined from 
equation (v) above 
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• Fort*= t*e=zsooc to ambient temperature 
Decrease temperature by 1 ooc per minute down to ambient temperature 
For 0.04 ::; 0 ::; 0.08m0·5 
Use equations (i) to (iii) above 
• Fort*= t*e=Goooc to ambient temperature 
Use equation (iv) above 
For 0 < 0.04m0'5 
Use equation (i) to (iii) for the entire cooling phase. 
For comparison purpose, all the three expressions for the cooling phase are used 
in the spreadsheet for parametric fire time temperature curves and the resulting 
curves are shown in Fig. 8-2 
Parametric Fire : Time-Temperature Curves for 
Different Cool Rate Formulae 
~  
/ ~ 
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- EC 1 (Modified-HERA) 
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Figure 8-2 Time-Temperature Curves for Different Cooling Rate Formulae 
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The EC1 (Modified-HERA) cooling curve was used in the original design by the 
consultant firm. For consistency it will also be used in this project. 
8.2.6 The'Heat Transfer Model 
8.2.6.1 Determination of Steel Temperature 
The temperature domain verification is used when the limiting steel temperature 
is compared with the maximum temperature reached in the design fire exposure. 
The limiting steel temperature is the temperature at which the load-bearing 
capacity of the member would just equal the design loads. In other words, it is the 
temperature above which the member would be expected to fail. Heat transfer 
calculation to determine steel temperature is simplified by using a lumped mass 
thermal calculation where the steel cross section is assumed to be at uniform 
temperature. The European Convention for Constructional Steelwork (ECCS 
1985) recommends the use of the following equations for time-temperature curves 
for protected and unprotected steel. 
8.2.6.2 Unprotected Steel 
The iterative calculation technique for unprotected steelwork uses the following 
equation: 
h1 HP /::;.T =--(T -T)/::;.t 
I A f I plcl 
(8.18) 
where /::;.Ts is the change in steel temperature over the time interval /::;.t CCC) 
h1 is the total heat transfer coefficient (W/m2K) 
Ps is the density of steel (kg/m3) 
Cs is the specific heat of steel (J/kgK) 
HpfA is the exposed surface area to mass ratio for the steel section (m-1) 
T1 is the mean air temperature during time interval /::;.t (°C) 
Ts is the mean steel temperature during time interval /::;.t (°C) 
M is the time interval ( s) 
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The total heat transfer coefficient ht is the sum of the radiative and convective 
heat transfer coefficients: 
(8.19) 
Where he is the convective heat transfer coefficient (W/m2K) 
ht is the radiative heat transfer coefficient (W/m2K) 
The Eurocode (ECl 1994) recommends that the value of the convective heat 
transfer coefficient be taken as 25W/m2K for the standard fire and 50W/m2K for 
the hydrocarbon fire. 
The radiative heat transfer coefficient is defined as: 
Where: cr is the Stefan Boltzman constant (56.7 x 10-12 kW/m2K4) 
8 is the resultant emissivity 
T r is the temperature in the fire compartment (K) 
Ts is the temperature ofthe steel (K) 
(8.20) 
Eurocodel (ECl 1994) recommends a value of resultant emissivity of 0.56 which 
is a product of the emissivity related to the fire compartment, usually taken as 0.8, 
and the emissivity related to the surface material, usually taken as 0.7. 
A computer spreadsheet program can be used in a step-by-step calculation 
technique assuming a lumped mass of steel at uniform temperature. A spreadsheet 
for calculating steel temperature using this approach is shown in Table 8.4 (from 
Milke and Hill, 1996, based on Gamble, 1989). EC2 (1995) suggests a time step 
of no more than 30 seconds, and a minimum value of the section factor Hp/ A of 
lOm-1. 
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Table 8-4 Spreadsheet Calculation for Heat Transfer in Unprotected Steel 
Members 
Steel Fire Temperature Heat transfer Change in steel 
Time temperature temperature Difference coefficient temperature 
T, Tr Tr- T, ht LiT, 
tl =Lit Initial steel Fire Tr- T, Calculate he Calculate from 
temperature T"" temperature from Tr and T, equation for LiT, 
at t = Lit/2 ht= hr+ he 
t2 = tt+Lit T,+ LiT, from Fire Tr- T, Calculate he Calculate from 
previous row temperature from Tr and T, equation for LiT, 
at t = t1 + ht=hr+ he 
Lit/2 
etc 
The detailed spreadsheet set up is described in Appendix I 
8.2.6.3 Protected Steel 
The iterative technique for protected steelwork is similar to that for unprotected 
steel. The equation is slightly different and does not require heat transfer 
1'1.'f,. = _H_P --=-ki _ -:-( ----'-~-"-sc-"-s ---=-J (rf _ 'f,. )M 
A d;p,.c.,. P 
PsCs +A2dipici 
(8.21) 
coefficients because it assumes that the external surface of the insulation is at the 
same temperature as the fire gases. It also assumes that the internal surface of tb (8 ·19) 
insulation is at the same temperature as the steel. The equation is: 
Where k; is the thermal conductivity of the insulating material 
d; is the thickness of the insulating material 
p; is the density of the insulating material 
c; is the specific heat of the insulating material 
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If the insulation is of low mass and specific heat such that the heat capacity of the 
insulation will not significantly slow the temperature increase of the steel, then 
the above equation can be simplified by omitting the term in the big {} brackets 
(ECCS 1985). That is, for lightly insulated members, the equation for the steel 
temperature rise is given by: 
The spreadsheet calculation is similar to that shown in Table 8-2 except that no 
heat transfer coefficient is required. EC2 (1995) suggests a time step of 30 
seconds, but Gamble (1989) shows that much longer steps can be used. 
8.2.7 Scenarios in Present Analysis 
In this project the original design by the consultant finn will be modelled as one 
scenario. In addition, two other scenarios are also modelled. The three scenarios 
are described below. 
8.2.7.1 Scenario 1: Original Design- Members Shielded by Ceiling or Wall 
Linings 
In the original design no passive protection is directly applied to the beams and 
columns. The suspended "Gib-Grid' ceiling system (which shields the beams) and 
the Gib-board wall claddings (which shield the columns) are the only passive 
protection. Both the ceiling and the wall claddings are assumed to fail 20 minutes 
after flashover. It is also assumed that within the 20 minutes before failure of the 
ceiling or wall claddings, the steel members are considered to be lightly protected 
and equation (8.22) is applicable. After the failure ofthe ceiling and wall claddings, 
the steel members are considered to be unprotected and equation (8.18) applies. 
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The "Gib-Grid" ceiling system uses standard 12.5mm Gib-board with taped and 
stopped joints. The Gib-board wall claddings are all 9.5mm thick. The thermal 
conductivity ofthe Gib-board is assumed to be 0.20 W/mK 
8.2.7.2 Scenario 2: Totally Unprotected Steel Members 
A model is also set up for the case where all unprotected steel members in the fire 
compartment, without the benefits of shielding from the ceiling or wall claddings, 
are fully exposed to the fire. 
8.2.7.3 Scenario 3: Steel Members Protected by Sprayed on Mineral Fibre 
In the same manner, a model is also set up for the case of steel members protected 
by sprayed on mineral fibre, again without the benefits of shielding from the 
ceiling and wall claddings. Equation (8.21) is used for the heat transfer 
calculation. The properties of the mineral fibre are assumed to be (Buchanan 
1999): 
Density: 300 kg/m3 
Thermal Conductivity: 0.10 W/mK 
Specific heat: 1100 J/kg K 
Water content: negligible 
8.2.8 Properties of Structural Steel at Elevated Temperatures 
In order to make calculations of temperatures in fire-exposed steel structures, it is 
necessary to know the properties of the structural steel at elevated temperatures. 
8.2.8.1 Thermal Properties 
The density of steel is 7850 kg/m3, remammg essentially constant with 
temperature. The specific heat of steel varies with temperature but for simple 
calculations the value can be taken as 600J/kg K. 
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8.2.8.2 Mechanical Properties 
The important mechanical properties of structural steel required for structural fire 
design are the yield strength and the modulus of elasticity. The variation of the 
yield strength and modulus of elasticity with temperature are shown in figure 8-3. 
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"0 
c 





OL__J ____ _L ____ -L----~----~--~ 
70 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 
Temperature ("F) 
Figure 8-3 Variation of Modulus of Elasticity and Yield Strength with 
Temperature A36 Steel (DeFalco 1974) 
Many national codes use approximations to the published data on actual variation 
of properties. Typical relationships are shown in Figure 8-4, where the line for 
structural steels is from AS 4100 and NZS 3404, and the lines for reinforcing steel 
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Figure 8-4 Reduction in Yield Strength and Modulus of Elasticity with 
Temperature - Design Curves (Buchanan 1999) 
The equations of the lines are: 
Ky,T = (905- T)/690 for structural steel 
Ky,T = (720- T)/470 for reinforcing steel 
Ky,T = (700- T)/550 for prestressing steel 
Where Ky,T = fy,T/ fy 
fy,T is the yield strength at temperature T (°C) 
fy, is the yield strength at 20°C 




The limiting steel temperature can be defined as the highest temperature attained 
by the steel member, when exposed to a fire, beyond which the member is not 
able to support the existing loadings. The limiting steel temperature depends not 
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only on the steel properties but also on the load and support conditions, 
dimensions, and geometry of the structural member. 
In clause 11.5 ofNZS 3404 (SNZ1997), the equation for determining the limiting 
steel temperature, which originates from equation (8.23a), states that the limiting 
steel temperature T1 (°C) is given by: 
T1 = 905 - 690 rf (8.24) 
Where rr is the ratio of the design action on the member under the design load for 
fire (G + QJ to the design capacity of the member (<PRJ at room temperature. 
Equation 8.24 is derived directly from equation 8.23a. 
8.2.10 Time to Attain Limiting Temperature 
The time for steel members to reach limiting temperature are obtained by two 
methods: 
(a) Empirical Correlations 
Simple empirical expressions for predicting the time t1 in minute for an 
unprotected steel member to reach a limiting temperature T1 (°C) when exposed to 
the standard fire are given in NZS 3404 (SNZ 1994) as follows: 
For 3 sided exposure 
t1 = -5.2 + 0.0221TI + 0.0-3.40 T1 V/F 
For four sided exposure 
t1 = -4.7 + 0.0263TI + 1.67TI V/F 
Where: F is the surface area of the steel section, per unit length (m2) 
V is the volume of steel per unit length (m3) 
(8.25) 
(8.26) 
Both of these equations are valid for FN in the range 15 to 275 m-1 (V/F in the 
range 3.6 to 67 mm) and T1 in the range 500°C to 800°C. For temperature below 
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500° C linear interpolation can be used based on the time at 500°C and the initial 
temperature 20°C. 
(b) Spreadsheet Calculation 
Equation (8.24) for determining limiting steel temperature has been input into the 
spreadsheet. Also included in the same spreadsheet are the time-temperature 
curves for steel members (protected or otherwise) exposed to the standard fire. 
The time taken for these steel members to attain T1 can therefore be obtained from 
the spreadsheet. 
8.2.11 Determination of Time Equivalence for Fire Severity 
In this project, the time equivalence is calculated by two methods: 
(a) Spreadsheet Method 
The maximum temperature of steel members protected by sprayed on mineral 
fibre and exposed to parametric fire, Tmax, is first obtained from the spreadsheet. 
The same protected member is then exposed to the standard fire and the time 
taken, te , for the steel to reach the temperature Tmax is obtained from the 
spreadsheet. The time te is the time equivalence. 
(a) Eurocode Formula 
The time equivalence is also calculated using the Eurocode formula (equation 4.6) 
which has been described in chapter 4. 
8.3 THE COMPLETE WORKING MODEL 
The fire model, heat transfer model and the structural response models have been 
combined into a single complete working model that can be used for structural 
fire design or to assess the responses of existing structures. The spreadsheet set up 




Analyses are carried out in both the temperature and time domains. In each 
domain, the three scenarios for the steel members are analysed : 
(i) unprotected, 
(ii) unprotected but shielded by suspended ceiling or wall cladding 
(iii) protected by sprayed on mineral fiber (ceiling and wall not accounted for) 
8.4.1 Temperature Domain Analysis 
(i) Unprotected Steel Members 
The limiting and maximum temperature for unprotected steel members is shown 
in Table 8.5. 
Table 8-5 Limiting and Maximum Steel Temperature of Unprotected Steel 
Members 
Steel Members Limiting Steel Maximum Steel Remark 
Temperature (0 C) Temperature (°C) 
AB: 460 UB 74.6 800 744 ok 
AC: 460 UB 74.6 810 754 ok 
BD: 460 UB 74.6 839 754 ok 
EF: 310 UB 40.4 666 765 failed 
It can be seen from Table 8-1 that for the case of unprotected steel members fully 
exposed to the fire in the fire compartment only one member fails under the 
temperature criterion. The member is the intermediate beam EF that supports the 
concrete slab. 
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Unprotected but Shielded Steel Members 
The results for the case of unprotected members shielded for 20 minutes by either 
the suspended ceiling or wall claddings ("shielded steel members") are shown in 
Table 8.6. 
Table 8-6 Limiting and Maximum Steel Temperature of "Shielded" Steel 
Members 
Steel Members Limiting Steel Maximum Steel Remark 
Temperature (°C) Temperature (°C) 
AB: 460 UB 74.6 800 628 ok 
AC: 460 UB 74.6 810 643 ok 
BD: 460 UB 74.6 839 643 ok 
EF: 310 UB 40.4 666 664 ok 
AA': 310 UC 158 806 550 ok 
BB':310 UC 158 848 550 ok 
CC': 310 UC 137 711 576 ok 
DD': 310 UC 137 793 576 ok 
As can be seen from Table 8.6, the maximum steel temperatures of "shielded" 
members exposed to the parametric fires are all less than the limiting steel 
temperatures. From these deterministic calculations, the steel members are 
deemed to possess the required fire resistance under the present conditions. 
Protected Members 
The case of the steel members protected by sprayed on mineral fibers and exposed 
to the same fire is shown in Table 8-7. 
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Table 8-7 Limiting and Maximum Steel Temperature of Protected Members 
Steel Members Limiting Steel Maximum Steel Remark 
Temperature (°C) Temperature (°C) 
AB: 460 UB 74.6 800 435 ole 
AC: 460 UB 74.6 810 452 ole 
BD: 460 UB 74.6 839 452 ole 
EF: 310 UB 40.4 666 476 ole 
AA': 310 UC 158 806 335 ole 
BB':310 UC 158 848 335 ole 
CC': 310 UC 137 711 371 ole 
DD': 310 UC 137 793 371 ole 
Results in Table 8-7 show that the maximum temperature attained by all the 
protected steel members are well below the limiting steel temperature. The 
protective coating has ensured safe performance. 
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8.4.2 Time Domain Analysis 
The three scenarios will be looked into viz (i) unprotected, (ii) shielded and (iii) 
protected by sprayed on mineral fiber. The results, for different methods of 
calculating "time to limiting temperature" and the "time equivalence", are shown 
and discussed in the next few pages. 
(i) Unprotected Steel Members' Performance 
The results for unprotected steel members are shown in Table 8-8 
The formula used for obtaining time to limiting steel (tvs) temperature is either 
equation (8.25) or (8.26). 
Table 8-8 Unprotected Steel Members' Performance under Time Domain 
Time to reach limiting 
temperature (min) Time Equivalence (min) 
Spreadsheet Formula Spreadsheet EC Formula 
Steel Member t11s tllf te/s te/f Remark 
BeamAB 27 30 36 29 Failed 
BeamAC 27 29 35 29 Failed 
BeamBD 32 30 35 29 Failed except 
when tetf is used 
BeamEF 15 20 33 29 Failed 
ColumnAA' 33 32 40 29 Failed except 
when tetr is used 
ColumnBB' 38 34 40 29 Failed except 
when tetr is used 
ColumnCC' 23 25 38 29 Failed 
ColumnDD' 29 27 38 29 Failed 
Note: In all cases, spreadsheet calculatiOn for the time eqUivalence IS based on 
steel members protected by sprayed on mineral fibre and exposed to parametric 
and standard fires 
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The following can be deduced from Table 8-8 
• All unprotected steel members will fail, except m some cases when the 
Eurocode formula for time equivalence is used 
• The formulae for calculating "time to limiting temperature" ( equation 8.25 
and 8.26) agree well with the spreadsheet calculations 
Unprotected but Shielded Members 
The results for the case of steel members shielded for 20 minutes by suspended 
ceiling or wall claddings are shown in Table 8-9. 
Table 8-9 "Shielded" Steel Members' Performance under Time Domain 
Time to reach limiting 
temperature (min) Time Equivalence (min) 
Spreadsheet Spreadsheet ECFormula 
Steel Member tus te/s telf Remark 
BeamAB 30 36 29 Failed except 
when te/f used 
BeamAC 30 35 29 Failed except 
when te/f used 
BeamBD 33 35 29 Failed except 
when te/f used 
BeamEF 23 33 29 Failed 
ColumnAA' 38 40 29 Failed except 
when te!r is used 
ColumnBB' 41 40 29 ole 
ColumnCC' 30 38 29 Failed except 
when te/f used 
ColumnDD' 34 38 29 Failed except 
when te/f used 
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The following can be deduced from Table 8-9: 
• Using suspended ceiling or wall claddings (with "fire resistance rating" of 20 
minutes) as shields for unprotected steel members have not enhanced their 
performance appreciably. 
• Eurocode formula for time equivalence is less conservative compared with the 
spreadsheet calculations for obtaining time equivalent. 
Protected Steel Members 
The results for the case of steel members protected by sprayed on mineral fibre is 
shown in Table 8-10 
Table 8-10 Protected Steel Members' Performance under Time Domain 
Time to reach limiting 
temperature (min) Time Equivalence (min) 
Spreadsheet Formula Spreadsheet ECFormula 
Steel Member t11s tllf 1ets te/f 
BeamAB 87 68 36 29 
BeamAC 83 63 35 29 
BeamBD 90 66 35 29 
BeamEF 53 43 33 29 
ColumnAA' 125 109 40 29 
ColumnBB' 138 116 40 29 
ColumnCC' 89 79 38 29 
ColumnDD' 107 91 38 29 
Beams AB, AC & BD : 460 UB 7 4.6; Beam EF: 310 UB 40.4; 










Data from Table 8-10 clearly shows that, under time domain analysis, all the steel 
members are only safe if passive protection like a sprayed on coating has been 
applied on the members. 
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8.5 DISCUSSION 
The results from analyses in the temperature and time domain show that the latter 
domain produce much more conservative results. The time safety margins are 
relatively lower than the temperature safety margins. The time domain analyses 
show that passive protection like sprayed on mineral fibre is required in order to 
produce safe performance, whereas even unprotected members can be considered 
safe under fire situation when analysed under the temperature domain. These 
disparities can be attributed to the following reasons: 
• Analysis in the temperature domain is carried out based on exposure only to 
the parametric fire. Because it is not necessary to compare thermal response to 
the standard fire, this method can be considered more accurate as less error 
and uncertainty is introduced. 
• For analysis in the time domain the "time to limiting temperature" and the 
"time equivalence" for fire severity are calculated based on exposure to the 
standard fire. The parametric fire is only used to determine the maximum steel 
temperature, the value of which is used in the exposure to the standard fire to 
obtain the time equivalence. Furthermore, the determination of the time 
equivalence is only valid for protected steel members. Hence, using the time 
equivalence (obtained from exposure of protected steel member) for deduction 
from "time to reach limiting temperature" for unprotected and "shielded" 
members to obtain the "time safety margin" may incur errors. 
• The same problem arises in the use of the Eurocode formula for time 
equivalence, the derivation of which is based on protected steel exposed to the 
standard fire. 
• For the case of protected steel the problem of comparing results from different 
"geometries" do not arise. Hence the time safety margin for protected steels 
agree very well with the temperature safety margin. 
• In the temperature domain analysis there are many cases ofthe maximum steel 
I-
temperatures going beyond 550°C and are considered safe because the limiti~g 
temperatures have not been reached. 550°C is considered by many national 
codes to be the "critical" steel temperature (Lie 1992) because at around this 
temperature, failure of structural steel is impending (Fitzgerald 1997) if the 
member is subjected to its maximum design load. The critical temperature is 




For this reason, it is widely claimed that structural steel works can be designed 
to withstand temperature up to 750°C without sign of failure (Robinson 1995 
and Purkiss 1996). The British Standard allows limiting temperature up to 
780°C for structural steel members in flexure (BS5950 1990). 
Temperature domain analysis is a more accurate method for assessing or 
validating design but the use of numerical methods or computer software to more 
accurately determine the steel temperature is needed so that a useful and accurate 
methodology for design can be derived. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has shown how simple analytical tools can be used to check the 
structural adequacy of steel members exposed to fire. The calculations are limited 
by the accuracy of methods of compiling the temperature of the steel members. The 
calculations in the time domain show the principles of the method, but these results 
are not accurate because of poor temperature calculation and the inherent inaccuracy 
of the time equivalent formula. 
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9 CASE STUDY II : RELIABILTY OF STRUCTURAL 
FIRE DESIGN OF A STEEL FRAMED BUILDING 
9.1 BASIS OF RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
In this case study, reliability analysis is carried out on a structural fire engineering 
design of a steel framed hotel building described in chapter 8. As stated in that 
chapter, the assessment of the structural performance of steel members under fire 
condition was carried under both the temperature and time domains. The bases of 
assessment are recapitulated below. 
(a) Temperature Domain Analysis 
In the temperature domain analysis, the basis of reliable or safe performance is 
that the maximum temperature attained by the structural steel member should not 
exceed the limiting temperature of the member. The limit state equation is thus 
given by: 
Tm=TJ-Tmax 
Where Tm is the temperature safety margin CCC) 
T1 is the limiting steel temperature for the steel member (°C) 
T max is the maximum temperature attained by the steel element (°C) 
(9.1) 
Failure occurs when the temperature safety margin is less than or equal to zero, 
that is: 
TM = T1- Tmax ~ 0 (9.2) 
Reliability analysis is carried out on the basis of determining the probability of 
failure, Pr, of the structural member, given the outbreak of a range of fully 
developed fires. The probability of failure is the probability of the temperature 
safety margin being less than or equal to zero, that is: 
Pr= P(Tm ~ 0) = P(T1- Tmax ~ 0) (9.3) 
Methods of calculating Tmax and T1 have been described in section 8.3.6 and 8.3.7 
respectively. 
104 
(b) Time Domain Analysis 
In the time domain, the consideration is that the fire resistance rating of the 
structural element can more than withstand the maximum fire severity (expressed 
as time equivalence) expected in the fire compartment. The limit state equation is 
therefore given by: 
M=R-S 
Where M is the safety margin (minute) 
R is the fire resistance rating (min) 
S is fire severity (min) 
(9.4) 
In this project, the fire resistance R is taken as the time for steel member to attain 
limiting temperature, t1. And the fire severity S is represented by the time 
equivalence, te. Equation (9.4) can thus be written as: 
tm = t1- te (9.5) 
where tm is the time safety margin 
The failure criterion is given by: 
(9.6) 
The probability of failure of member, Pr, is thus given by: 
Pr= P(tms 0) = P(t1 -tes 0) (9.7) 
Methods of calculating te and t1 have been described in section 8.3.8 and 8.3.9 
respectively. 
The basis of reliability analysis is the setting up of a model to evaluate equation 
(9.3) and (9.7) for a range of scenarios. The model should therefore be capable of 
generating a wide range of scenarios for the fire and the corresponding thermal 
and structural responses. 
As described in chapter 8, a number of parameters have gone into the calculation 
of T1,, T max, t1 and te. In assessing the reliability of the structural fire design carried 
out in chapter 8, all these parameters have to be treated as random variables, as 
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they rightly are. Reliability analysis is only carried out on all the structural steel 
members found in a representative hotel room. 
9.2 RELIABILTY ANALYSIS OF DESIGN 
9.2.1 Method of Analysis 
The tool used here for reliability analysis is Monte Carlo Simulation which has 
been described in section 6.4.3. As described in chapter 8 the necessary 
parameters and variables had been entered into computer spreadsheets for 
determining the air-time temperature curves due to parametric fires in different 
firecells. The thermal and structural responses of the steel elements were also 
determined by calculations done on the same spreadsheets. A sketch of the 
representative fire compartment showing the room dimension and steel member 
sizes are shown in Fig.9.1. 
A /~ 8.44m 
r B 
3.58m E 
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Beam Size Column Size 
AB 460 UB 74.6 AA' 310 uc 158 
EF/CD 310 UB 40.4 BB' 310 uc 158 
AC 460 UB 74.6 CC' 310 uc 137 
BD 460 UB 74.6 DD' 310UC137 
Figure 9-1 Fire Compartment Dimension and Steel Member Sizes 
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In chapter 8 the spreadsheet calculations have been done deterministically 
because only single value of each of the parameters has been used. In the Monte 
Carlo simulation using @RISK software, the same spreadsheet is used for the 
creation of the model for simulation. The main difference between the @RISK 
spreadsheet and the deterministic Excel spreadsheet is that the basic parameters in 
@RISK spreadsheet are treated as random variables and keyed into the cells of 
the @RISK spreadsheet as probability distribution functions. In treating the 
parameters as random variables, as they rightly are, it is most important that the 
probability distribution function chosen should, as accurately as possible, reflect 
the actual behaviour of these random variables. The setting up of a model for 
Monte Carlo simulation of the structural response of a steel beam EF (31 0 UB 
40.4) in the representative fire compartment is described below. 
9.2.2 Characterisation ofRandom Variables 
The basic variables in the spreadsheet are characterised as random variables as 
follows. 
(a) Room Depth 
Variation is mainly due to construction and measurement errors. These errors are 
estimated to be in the order of 1%. The room depth is most realistically treated as 
a random variable which exhibits a triangular distribution. Triangular distribution 
is characterised by three parameters viz the most likely value, a minimum and a 
maximum value. Both the minimum and maximum value have zero probability of 
occurring. The nominal depth of 8.440m can be regarded as the most likely value. 
The addition and subtraction of 1% of the most likely value give the maximum 
value of 8.524m and a minimum value of 8.356m respectively. 
(b) Room Width 
Similarly, the room width is treated as a random variable with triangular 
distribution. The most likely value is nominal width of 3.580m. The minimum 
value is 3.544m and the maximum value is 3.616m 
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(c) Room Height 
In the same manner, the room height exhibits a triangular distribution with a most 
likely value of2.400m, a minimum value of2.376m and a maximum of2.424m 
(d) Window Area 
The average window area has been worked out from all rooms of a particular 
design. There is more variation in this random variable and it is assumed to 
exhibit a normal distribution. The mean value of the window area is taken to be 
4.3m2 and, assuming a coefficient of variation of 0.10, the standard deviation 
worked out to be 0.430m2. 
(e) Window Height 
The weighted average height is assumed to be normally distributed and the 
nominal window height taken as the mean value of a normal distribution with a 
coefficient of variation of 0.05. The mean height is 1.540m with a standard 
deviation of0.077m 
(f) Thermal Inertia (.V(kpcp)) 
A value of 1160 J/m2s0·5K is recommended by HERA for small enclosures with 
over 50% of the wall area in drywall gypsum board construction (HERA 1995). 
This value is taken as the mean value of the thermal inertia, which is assumed to 
be normally distributed with a coefficient of variation assumed to be 0.1 0. The 
standard deviation is therefore 116J/m2s0·5K. 
(g) Fuel Load Density 
A value of 400MJ/m2 of floor area was used in the deterministic spreadsheet 
calculation. This is the design value recommended in the Annex to Fire Safety 
Documents of the Approved Documents (BIA 1995b) for fire hazard category 1, 
which includes hotel. However, this design value is the 801h percentile fire load of 
the range of fire load density stated for the relevant fire hazard category. The 
variation in the fuel load density can be assumed to be normally distributed with 
a coefficient ofvariation of25% (ref European 1986). As such the mean value of 
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the fuel load density IS worked to be 330MJ/m2· The standard deviation is 
therefore 83MJ/m2• 
(h) Steel Section Factor Hp/A 
The section factors are normally supplied by steel manufacturers and are not 
expected to show much variation. However, values supplied by different 
manufacturers for the same nominal section do differ slightly. The section factor 
is assumed to exhibit triangular distribution with a minimum value of 180, most 
likely value of210 and maximum value of230 m-1. 
(i) Steel Density 
Steel density is not expected to show much variation at normal temperature but 
will vary with temperature. The steel density is treated as a random variable 
which has a normal distribution between a minimum of 781 Okg/m3 and maximum 
of7890kg/m3. The mean ofthe truncated normal distribution is 7850kg/m3 with a 
standard deviation of 40kg/m3· 
G) Specific Heat of Steel 
In general, the specific heat of steel shows a gradual increase with temperature. 
For simple calculation, the specific heat is usually taken as 600J/kgK. (Buchanan 
1997). To account for the variation, the value of the specific heat is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a mean of 600J/kgK, and a coefficient of variation of 
0.05. The minimum value of the specific heat is taken as 540KJ/kgK and the 
maximum value 660KJ/kgK. 
(k) Concrete Slab Thickness 
The concrete slab thickness is expected to be uniform with any variation due to 
the casting process and shrinkage. The nominal thickness of the concrete slab is 
130mm, which can be regarded as the mean value of the assumed normal 
distribution of the slab thickness. The coefficient of variation is small and 
assumed to be 0.02. The truncated normal distribution is assumed to have a 
minimum value of 124mm and a maximum value of 136mm. The standard 
deviation is 3mm. 
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(I) Density of Concrete 
Density of concrete varies widely, depending on the aggregate mix, and can range 
from1900kg/m3 to 2500kg/m3• A truncated normal distribution between these 
lower and upper values with a mean of 2200kg/m3 and standard deviation of 
11 Okg/m3 is assumed. 
(m)Weight of Wall and Partition (Component of Dead Load) 
A truncated normal distribution with a mean of 0.50KPa, coefficient of variation 
of 0.10, minimum value of 0.40KPa and a maximum of 0.70KPa would 
accurately describe the distribution. 
(n) Self Weight of Steel Beam (Component of Dead Load) 
The self weight of steel section is usually supplied by the manufacturer and the 
assumed distribution is a truncated normal distribution with a mean of 
0.404KN/m, coefficient ofvariation of0.05, minimum value of0.364KN/m and a 
maximum value of 0.444KN/m. 
( o) Live Load 
Loads are due to people, their possessions, storage materials etc. Live load may 
be divided into two categories: 
1. Sustained live loads: long-term loads associated with normal use 
2. Extraordinary loads: short-term transient loads caused by abnormal events (e.g 
a big party) 
The total live load is the sum of these two live load components. Each can be 
represented by a discrete stochaistic process, as illustrated in Fig 9 .1. 
Load Ls (sustained) 
(a) 
0 
Load Le (extraordinary) 
(b) 
0 
Total live load 
(c) 
0 
Figure 9-2 Time Histories of Typical Live Loads 





The value of the sustained live load and its probability distribution function are 
arrived at as follows. 
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From NZS 4203: 1992 Table 3 .4.1- Basic Live Loads for Floors and Stairs, the 
basic live load, Qb, for hotel occupancy is taken as 2.0KPa. 
Reduced live load, Q, is given by Q = \jfaQb where \If a is the area reduction factor. 
For a tributary area, A1 = 15.1m2, the area reduction factor is given by 
1;::: \jfa = 0.4 + 2.71"-iAt, that is, \jfa = 0.4 + 2.7/"-i15.1 = 1.09 
Therefore \jfa = 1. 
That is Q = 1 x 2.0 = 2.0 kPa 
The factored live load for the ultimate limit state, Qu, is given by Qu = \jfuQ where 
\jfu is the live load combination factor and takes a value of 0.4. 
Therefore Qu = 0.4 x 2.0 = 0.8 kPa 
In the deterministic calculation of strength and stability under fire condition, the 
load combination or the fire design load, Lr , is given by Lr = G + Qu where G is 
the dead load. 
In a probabilistic calculation, the factored live load Qu has to be treated as a 
random variable with a probability distribution function. As to the type of 
distribution the answer is given in commentary 2.4.3.2 in NZS 4203:1992 Vol. 2 
which states in part: 
The specified values of live load are meant to be the peak values of live 
load for a 50 year life time with a 5% chance of exceedance. 
This means that the live load exhibits an extreme value type I distribution of the 
form: Fy(y) = exp[-e-a(y-u)] ref: Ang and Tang (1985) 
Where Y is the random variable "live load under normal condition" and y is the 
value of the random variable. 
The same distribution is assumed for the random variable "live load under fire 
condition" denoted by Yr. The distribution for Yr is given by: 
FYf = exp[-e-a(yf- u)] 
For Yr = 0.8kPa, Fyr(0.8) = exp[ -e-a(o.s- u)] 
5% chance of exceedance in 50 years means that the chance of exceedance in a 
year= 5/50 = 0.1% 
0.1% chance of exceedance => exp[ -e-a(O.s- u)] = 1- 0.001 
exp[ -e-a(o.s- u)] = 0.999 (1) 
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Also, for Type I distribution, the mean my and the standard deviation cry for a 1 
year distribution is given by: 
my= u + qJ!a (2) 
where qJ =Euler constant =0.577 
and cry= n/( a.Y6) = 1.283/a (3) 
Ellingwood et al (1980) reported a coefficient of variation of 0.15 for Type I 
distribution live load. 
Therefore cry/my= 0.15 
1.283/(ua +CJJ) = 0.15 from which ua = 7.976 
From ( 1) -e-a(0.8 -u) = ln 0.999 
-a(0.8- u) = ln(-ln 0.999) 
a(0.8 - u) = 6.907 
Substituting (4) in (5) and solving we get u = 0.43 and a= 18.60 
Therefore the 1 year distribution is given by 
Fyt{y) = exp[ -e-18.60(y- 0.43)] 
For 50 years lifetime, the distribution is given by: 
Fyt{y) = exp[-e -18.60 (y- 0.43 )]so 
On simplifying we get Fy(y) = exp[ -e-18.60 (y- 0.64 )] 
Therefore, the mean live load of the type 1 distribution is 0.64 kPa. 
(p) Yield Stress of Steel 
(4) 
(5) 
Erasmus and Smail (1989) in their statistical study of BHP grade 250 and 350 
structural steel reported that the yield stress of BHP grade 250 structural steel is 
normally distributed with a mean value of 290MPa and standard deviation of 
13MPa. The characteristic yield stress is 269MPa. As less than 5% of the steel 
section is expected to have a yield stress less than 269MPa, the normal 
distribution is truncated at a minimum value of 225MPa and maximum value of 
340Mpa to ensure that realistic values are used in the simulation. 
( q) Time to Ceiling Failure 
The nominal fire resistance rating for Gib-board is FRR 30/30/30 
(Winstone1997). In the deterministic assessment, the ceiling and wall cladding 
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material is conservatively assumed to fail at 20 minute after commencement of 
fire. For probabilistic risk assessment, a scenario analysis should be done whereby 
the time to failure takes on a range of value. Hence the time to failure is assumed 
to be a random variable which exhibits normal distribution. The mean value is 
taken to be 20 minute and the coefficient of variation assumed to be 0.25. To be 
realistic, the minimum time to failure is fixed at 15 minute and the maximum time 
fixed at 30 minute. A truncated normal distribution is input into the spreadsheet. 
(r) U Beam Section Modulus 
The plastic section modulus is a geometrical property and is not expected to vary 
very much. However, data supplied by different manufacturers show slightly 
different value for the same nominal section. The plastic section modulus for 310 
UB 40.4 manufactured by BHP is 633 x 103 mm3 (BHP 1998). This is taken to be 
the mean value of a normal distribution for the section modulus with a coefficient 
of variation of 0.01. The distribution is truncated with a minimum value of 610 
amd a maximum value of 655 x 103 mm3. 
(s) Thermal Conductivity of Ceiling Material 
The ceiling is made from Gib board with thermal conductivity assumed to be 0.20 
W/mK. (Winstone 1997). This value is also assumed to be the mean value of the 
random variable - thermal conductivity of ceiling material. The distribution is 
assumed to be normal with a coefficient ofvariation of0.05. The minimum value 
is assumed to be 0.16W/mK. and the maximum to be 0.24W/mK.. 
(t) Thickness of Ceiling Material 
The nominal thickness of the Gib-board is 0.0125m. This is taken as the mean 
value of an assumed normal distribution for the thickness. As the thickness is not 
expected to vary much, the coefficient of variation is assumed to be 0.05. The 
minimum value is taken to be 0.0106m and the maximum to be 0.0144m. 
(u) Thermal Conductivity of Sprayed on Protection Material 
The selected protection material is a sprayed on mineral fibre. The thermal 
conductivity is assumed to be 0.10W/mK. (Buchanan 1999). This is also taken to 
be the mean value of the assumed normal distribution for this random variable. 
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Because of the greater variation in material properties, the coefficient of variation 
is assumed to be 0.15. 
(v) Specific Heat Capacity of Sprayed on Protection Material 
The specific heat capacity of the protecting material is assumed to be a normally 
distributed random variable with a mean value of 1100J/kgK (Buchanan 1999). 
The coefficient ofvariation is assumed to be 0.15. 
(w) Thickness of Sprayed on Protection Material 
This is assumed to be a random variable with value assumed to range from 
0.006m to 0.015m. The mean value of the distribution is assumed to be 0.010m. 
As the thickness of insulation is dependent on the skill of the spray painter and the 
consistency of the material, this random variable is expected to show considerable 
variation. The coefficient of variation is thus assumed to be 0.20. 
(x) Density of protection material 
There are different types and brand of spray mineral fiber material suitable for 
protecting steel. To account for the variation, the density of material is assumed 
to be a normally distributed random variable. For this modelling the mean density 
of the protection material is taken to be 300 kg/m3 (Buchanan 1999). A wide 
variation in the value of the density for different brands is expected. Therefore the 
coefficient of variation for this distribution is assumed to be 0.20. 
The random variables for the complete working model have now being defined. 
No change is required for any of the formula calculations in the spreadsheet. 
Monte Carlo simulation can now take place. 
9.3 RUNNING THE SIMULATION 
With the @RISK model set up it is necessary to carry out the following before 
running the Monte Carlo simulation: 
• Select the outputs of interest from the simulations. In this case, the outputs of 
interest are those defined in equations (9.1) and (9.2), that is, for each steel 
element, the maximum steel temperature, limiting steel temperature, 
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temperature safety margin, the fire resistance rating, time equivalence for fire 
severity and the time safety margin. 
• Select the simulation settings which include: fixing the random number seed 
generator so that the whole series of simulation can be repeated under the 
same conditions; fixing the number of iterations to achieve desired accuracy; 
select sampling technique - Monte Carlo or the more modem Latin Hypercube 
sampling. 
9.3.1 Analysing Simulation Outputs 
The @RISK software presents its simulation outputs in the form of complete 
statistical data on all the basic (input) variables and the selected outputs. 
Properties like the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, percentile values 
and so on are displayed. A sample output is shown in Appendix II. Other 
important functions of the @RISK program are generation of frequency 
histograms of the outputs, sensitivity analysis, scenario analysis, and others. The 
output function of interest in this project is the frequency histogram of any output 
(and input) which can be formatted into line graph to obtain the relative frequency 
distributions or the cumulative distribution function. As an example the relative 
frequency distributions of the maximum steel temperature and the limiting steel 
temperature for a 310 UB 40.4 beam protected by spray on mineral fibre are 
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Figure 9-3Relative Frequency Distribution of Maximum and Limiting Steel 
Temperature for a Protected Beam EF (310 UB 40.4) 
Fig.9.3 clearly depicts the reliability problem here as a capacity-demand problem. 
However, reliability cannot be directly deduced from Fig.9.3. It can be more 
easily deduced from the cumulative distribution function of the temperature safety 
margin. 
9.3.2 Reliability Analysis Results 
9.3.2.1 Probability of Failure 
Several simulations were carried out for different structural steel members in the 
selected fire compartment. The output of interest here is the cumulative 
distribution (CDF) of the temperature safety margin and the resistance safety 
margin. The probability of failure of these structural members can be deduced 
from the CDF of the members. A typical CDF for the case of the beam EF (310 
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Figure 9-4 Cumulative Distribution Function of the Temperature Safety 
Margin for Unprotected but Ceiling Shielded Beam EF (310 UB 40.4) 
From Fig.9-4 the probability of failure is worked out to be 0.0673, giving a ~ 
value of 1.5. Simulations and analysis in both the temperature and time domains 
were performed for all structural elements in the fire compartment for the case of 
unprotected, shielded and protected members and the results are as follows. 
9.3.2.2 Temperature Domain Analysis 
Under the temperature domain analysis, failure occurs when the temperature 
safety margin is less than or equal to zero, that is: 
from equation (9 .1) TM = T1- Tmax:::;; 0 
Where: TM =Temperature Safety Margin 
T1 =Steel limiting temperature 
T max = Maximum steel temperature 
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The probability of failure given the outbreak of a range of fully developed fires is 
the probability of the temperature safety margin being less than or equal to zero, 
that is: 
Probability of failure, Pr= P(TI- Tmax::::; 0) 
The probability of failure for various steel members with different protection 
systems and when exposed to a range of parametric fires is shown in Table 9-1. 
Table 9-1 Probability of Failure (Pr) and Reliability Index (p) of Members 
with Different Protection Systems -Analysis in Temperature Domain 
Unprotected Ceiling/wall Shielded Protected 
Steel Member Pr f3 Pr f3 Pr f3 
BeamAB 1.41 X 10-J 2.98 2.69 X 10-'1 3.42 0 6 
BeamAC 7.72 X 10-'1 3.18 1.76 X 10-'1 3.57 0 6 
BeamBD 5.11 X 10-J 3.88 1.34 X 10--' 4.20 0 6 
BeamEF 0.31527 0.48 0.0728 1.46 0 6 
ColumnAA' 2.79 X 10-;, 4.05 0 6 0 6 
ColumnBB' 0 6 0 6 0 6 
ColumnCC' 3.62 X 10-..: 1.79 2.59 X 10-.) 2.80 0 6 
ColumnDD' 6.84 X 10-;, 3.81 2.64 X 10-.) 4.05 0 6 
Table 9-1 shows that the two members with the least fire resistance are the beam 
EF and column CC'. Beam EF has around 32% probability of failing if it is 
unprotected and around 7% probability of failure if shielded by the Gib-board 
ceiling. Column CC' has 4% probability of failure if unprotected and 0.3% of 
failure if shielded by Gib-board wall claddings. Analysis in the temperature 
domain also shows that the probability of failure can be very low even for 
unprotected members. Whether this will result in unsafe design would be 
discussed later. For all cases of protection by sprayed on mineral fibre of around 
1 Omm thickness, the probability of failure has gone down to practically zero. 
Reliability index value of 6 is fixed for cases where the probability of failure is 
practically zero. 
9.3.2.3 Time Domain Analysis 
In analysis under the time domain, the failure criterion is: 
t1- te ~ 0 
where: t1 is the time to reach limiting temperature (fire resistance) 
te is the time equivalence (fire severity) 
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As explained in section 8.3.9, t1 the "time to reach limiting temperature" can be 
obtained by two methods: 
(a) Empirical correlations (SNZ 1994): 
For 3 sided exposure, from equation (8.25) 
t1 = -5.2 + 0.0221 T1 + 0.0-3.40 T1 V/F 
For four sided exposure, from equation (8.26) 
t1 = -4.7 + 0.0263TI + 1.67TI V/F 
For ease of reference, t1 obtained from these correlations are designated as 
t1(formula) 
(b) The value of t1 can also be obtained from the spreadsheet for the fire model, 
heat transfer model and the structural response model explained in section 8. For 
ease of reference, t1 obtained from spreadsheet is designated as t1 (cal) 
There are also two methods for calculating the time equivalence te, viz from the 
spreadsheet, designated here as te( cal), and by using the Eurocode formula 
(equation 4.6), designated here as te (EC1) 
Therefore, with two methods each of obtaining t1 and te there are four 
combinations of the limit state equation. They are designated here as: 
Time Domain 1: t1 (formula)- te(cal) 
Time Domain 2: t1 (cal) - te( cal) 
Time Domain 3: t1 (formula)- te(EC1) 
Time Domain 4: t1 (cal)- te(EC1) 
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The probability of failure of a steel member, analysed under any of the time 
domain designated from 1 to 4 is the probability of violation of the limit state 
equations. 
The results for analyses under the time domain for the steel member (beam EF) 
with the least fire resistance are presented in Table 9-2. For comparison, the result 
from temperature domain analysis is included in the Table. 
Table 9-2 Probability of Failure (Pr) and Reliability Index (p) of Beam EF 
with Different Protection Systems- Analysis in the Time Domain 
Unprotected Ceiling Shielded Protected 
Failure Criteria Pr p Pr p Pr 
Time Domain 1 
t, (formula) - te (cal) s 0 0.9747 0 - - 0.0020 
Time Domain 2 
t, (cal) - te (cal) s 0 0.9986 0 0.8294 0 0 
Time Domain 3 
t, (formula)- te (EC1) s 0 0.5853 0 - - 0.0237 
Time Domain 4 
t, (cal)- te (EC1) s 0 0.8169 0 0.4211 0.20 0.0043 
Tem_Qerature Domain 
T,-Tmax S 0 0.31527 0.48 0.0728 0.48 0 
The followings are observed from the data in Table 9-2: 
• Compared with the temperature domain analysis, the probability of failure has 









• In particular, the analysis shows that the unprotected beam EF is almost 
certain to fail when the time equivalence (te (cal) ) is computed from the 
spreadsheet. 
• The probability of failure is decreased when the time equivalence ( te(EC1)) 
is calculated from the Eurocode formula. 
• The formula for determining the time to reach limiting temperature agrees 
well with the spreadsheet method for calculating the same. 
The differences in results between the two domains and within the time domain 
(for different criteria) would become more apparent when one looks at the results 
for all structural members in the fire compartment. 
9.3.2.4 Comparison of Results from Different Domains of Analysis 
The probability of failure of all steel members, analysed under the two domains, 
are plotted as bar charts in order to better see the differences between them. 
Figure 9-5 shows the bar chart for the case of unprotected steel beams. 
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The bar chart for the case of unprotected columns is shown in Figure 9-6. 
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Parametric Fires - Results from Analysis under Different Domains 
Examination of figure 9-5 and 9-6 reveal the following: 
• Analysis in the temperature domain shows the lowest probability of failure for 
all members. Except for beam EF and column CC', the probability of failure 
for all unprotected members is practically zero. This means that temperature 
domain analysis gives the least conservative results. 
• Analysis in the "time domain 2" (where both the t, and te are calculated by 
spreadsheets) results in the highest probability of failure for all members. This 
method of analysis thus gives the most conservative results. 
• The empirical correlations provided by NZS 3404 (SNZ 1997) for time to 
reach limiting temperature ("time domain 1 ") agree very well with the 
spreadsheet method of calculation ("time domain 2"). 
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• The usage of the Eurocode formula (EC1 1994) for time equivalence has 
resulted in the reduction in the probability of failure, as shown by the results 
for "time domain 3" and "time domain 4" analyses. This trend confirms the 
same unconservative results from the deterministic calculations in section 
8.5.2. 
9.3.2.5 Results for Protected Steel Members 
(i) Unprotected but Shielded Members 
The result for the case where the steel members are unprotected but shielded from 
the fires by suspended Gib-board ceilings or wall claddings are shown in figure 
9-7 and 9-8. Figure 9-7 shows the results for steel beams shielded by suspended 
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"Time domain 1 and 3 analysis" are not applicable in this case. The results show 
that using a suspended Gib-board ceiling with a fire resistance of around 20 
minutes to shield the beams from direct heating of the fire has not appreciably 
improved the performance of the beams under fire condition. This is not 
susprising given that the time equivalent ranges from 29 minutes (Eurocode 
formula) to 36 minutes (spreadsheet calculation for protected beam AB) in the 
deterministic calculations. The results from the Monte Carlo simulation is 
expected to be worse because of the wider range of values of parameters used in 
the iterative calculations. 
The case of steel columns shielded by Gib-board wall claddings from direct 
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Figure 9-8 Probability of Failure of "Shielded" Columns Exposed to 
Parametric Fires -Results from Different Analysis Domains 
Figure 9-8 again shows that there is no substantial improvement in the column 
performance if the wall claddings only have a fire resistance of around 20 
minutes. More will be discussed on the role of suspended ceiling and wall 
125 
claddings as passive protection systems in the general discussion in the next 
section. 
(ii) Protected Steel Members 
Except for the case of protected beam EF whereby the probability of failure of 
failure ranges from 0.2% to around 2.4% when analysed under the time domain, 
the probability of failure for all other protected steel members is practically nil, 
irrespective of the methods of analysis. 
9.4 DISCUSSION 
Analysis of structural reliability of individual steel members in a representative 
hotel room when exposed to a range of possible parametric fires has been carried 
out. A qualitative comparison with the results of the deterministic calculations in 
chapter 8 show that more members can be considered unsafe when reliability 
analysis has been carried out. However, a definite conclusion cannot yet be made 
until the acceptable probability of failure and safety index has been fixed. This 
will be done in the next chapter. At the same time the results of this reliability 
analysis are far from being absolute and should only be treated as being nominal 
or indicative for the following reasons: 
• All calculated probabilities of failure (and therefore the reliability index) are 
conditional probabilities given the outbreak of a fully developed fire. The 
calculation of the overall probability of failure would incorporate factors like 
probability of ignition, flashover, operation of active protection system, 
response of the fire services and other factors. This will be discussed further 
in the next chapter. 
• The structural response and hence the reliability of the whole structure or even 
sub-assemblies are very different from that of individual members. In fact, the 
sub-assemblies or the whole structure has a greater reserve of strength under 
elevated temperature compared to that estimated for individual members 
(Clifton 1998). This is due mainly to the structural continuity and redundancy 
found in the whole structure which allows for load sharing effect under any 
loading condition, including thermal loading (Buchanan 1999). 
126 
• Notwithstanding the above paragraph, analysis of global behaviour of whole 
structures goes well beyond the requirement of most current regulatory 
approval systems which look only at isolated members and not on their 
interaction (lEA 1989). Computer programs like FASBUS (AISI 1980) and 
CEFICOSS ( Shleich 1987) are available to evaluate structural adequacy of an 
entire building with fire in one compartment. However, Sullivan et al (1994), 
in their review of 13 such programs, concluded that none of them are user 
friendly or sufficiently well documented for routine use as design tools. 
• The methodology for structural fire design elaborated in this repmi constitutes 
only a small part of the overall design strategy as outlined in chapter 2. The 
overall design strategy requires a wholistic approach that takes into account 
factors like overall layout, compartmentation, perfom1ance of non-structural 
building elements, active and passive protection systems, human behaviour 
and a host of other factors. And, mainly for economic reason, a trade off can 
be struck between the various protective features. The latter aspect certainly 
requires experience and ingenuity. 
• Because of the greater uncertainties associated with fire science and 
engineering at this point in time, it is safer to overdesign. The fact that whole 
unprotected steel structure has greater fire resistance than the individual 
members (as proven in tests or actual cases) may not be enough justification 
to forego, as a cost saving measure, passive protection system. 
• The use of suspended ceilings in structural fire protection has become an 
accepted practice in many countries (Read & Adams 1979, Fitzgerald 1997, 
Feeney 1998). Pettersson, et al (1976) worked out a method of calculating 
heat transfer through the ceiling but the technique is considered too complex 
for simple design work. The assumption that steel beams are lightly protected 
for only the first 20 minutes in the original design and in this project may be 
too conservative. If the ceiling is to be depended upon as a protective barrier, 
the most impmiant thing is to ensure that the suspended ceiling is designed 
and constmcted to be fire rated (Fitzgerald 1997). 
• Because of the limitations described in Chapter 8, only the temperature domain 
results in this chapter should be used for assessing actual designs. 
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10 TARGET RELIABILITY 
10.1 PRELIMINARY 
Before attempting to relate the results of the two case studies undertaken in this 
project to issues like risk acceptability and target reliability, it is deemed 
necessary to address fundamental questions about the meaning of related terms 
like "failure" and "probability of failure". 
10.1.1 Meaning of Failure 
What is failure? In engineering practice, failure is what the engineer defines it to 
be and nothing else. For example, if the stress induced by an earthquake exceeds 
the ultimate stress of the material, it could be called a failure. Alternatively, if the 
stress exceeds the yield stress of the material it could also be called failure. In 
both cases it is not necessary for the building to collapse like a pack of cards for 
the meaning of failure to be appreciated. Similarly, in structural steel fire design, 
if the failure criterion of the maximum steel temperature exceeding the limiting 
steel temperature is met, the member should be deemed to have failed absolutely 
without the need to physically check for signs of crack, excessive deflection and 
so on. The same reasoning applies when the failure criterion is the time 
equivalence exceeding the fire resistance rating. This qualification of the meaning 
of failure is necessary to reduce any doubt or argument as to whether failure can 
or has occurred. The underlying analyses can be questioned or the criterion 
changed; but once the criterion is fixed or agreed upon, it should become the basis 
for either design acceptance or reassessment/ redesign. 
10.1.2 Probability of Failure 
What does the calculated probability of failure Pr mean? Can it be related to 
observed rates of failure for actual structures under fire situation? How can a 
knowledge of Pr helps in achieving safer or more economical structures? These 
are important questions and ones about which a degree of controversy and 
disagreement still exists (Melchers 1987), and will not be discussed here. Suffice 
to say that there is no such thing as absolute probability of failure simply because 
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it is impossible to account for all uncertainties. Therefore, reliability analysis 
considering only a subset of uncertainties will result in a probability estimate 
which should be termed a "nominal" measure (Melchers 1987). This term has 
been applied to results of the two case studies in this project. 
10.1.3 Acceptable Probability of Failure 
When a reliability assessment has been performed it must be decided whether the 
calculated probability of failure is acceptable. Acceptable probability of failure is 
seldom encoded for a specific engineering interest, for example, structural 
collapse during fire. A common criterion for risk acceptability is to compare the 
calculated probability of failure with societal risk (Rowe 1977). 
An attempt will be made in the next section to calculate the acceptable probability 
of failure for accidental building fire situation and the results of the reliability 
analyses in the two case studies will be assessed. 
10.2 CALCULATION OF ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY OF 
FAILURE 
In the two case studies (chapter 7 and 9) the probability of failure of building 
elements under fire condition have been calculated. The next important question 
is what constitutes acceptable probability of failure and reliability index? 
A document that provides a methodology for calculating the acceptable 
probability of failure is the Design Guide - Structural Fire Safety published by the 
Conseil International du Batiment (CIB 1986). The following are adapted from 
Appendix 5: Safety Factors yand Differentiation Factors Yn ofthe document. 
1 0.2.1 Failure Probabilities 
The probability for attaining a limit state defined, for example, by the failure 
condition M = R - S s; 0 is calculated by considering the probability distribution 
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functions of the random variables R and S. The probability of failure Pf is 
expressed as: 
Pf= P(R- S:::; 0) (10.1) 
Methods of calculating the probabilities are the first-order second moment 
method (FOSM) and the method of Monte Carlo simulation as described in 
chapter 6. If Pf,a and Pa represent the acceptable failure probability and safety 
index respectively, the reliability verification is accomplished by ensuring that: 
(10.2) 
10.2.2 Acceptable Failure Probabilities 
The failure probability decisive for the (accidental) fire design situation may be 
specified as : 
(10.3) 
Where Pf is the acceptable failure probability for a certain reference period. 
Different value may be allocated to different safety classes - depending on the 
consequence of failure. Example values for acceptable lifetime (50 years) failure 
probabilities are listed in Table 10-1. 
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Table 10-1 Acceptable lifetime failure probabilities* (CEB 1976) 
Expected number of Economic losses 
fatalities in case of fire Low Medium High 
Low(~ 0.1) 10-.} 10-'+ 10-J 
Medium(~ 1.0) 10-4 10-5 10-6 
High c~ 1o.o) 10-5 10-6 10-7 
* All values are mdicative and have to be checked on a natwnal basis 
P a is the probability of occurrence of severe fires within the reference period 
considered. A simple estimate is obtained from 
Pa = P(fire)PtPz .... (10.4) 
with P(fire) representing the probability of (initial) fire outbreak, which depends 
on the occupancy and size of the compartment. In a general presentation P(fire) 
can be modelled by the following (Rutstein & Clarke1979): 
P(fire) =pAx (10.5) 
Where p denotes the probability of occurrence per m2/year. 
A is the total fire compartments area (m2) 
X is an index with value ::; 1. 0 
Assuming X= 1.0 would therefore be conservative. Example values for p 
(per m2 and year) are given in Table 10.2. 
Table 10-2 Probabilities of Occurrence of Fires* (Rutstein & Clarke 1979) 
Occupancy Probability per m" and year 
Dwelling 10-J 
Offices 10-6 
Industrial buildings 10-6 
*All values are mdicative only and have to be checked on national basis. 
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P1, P2 .... .identify the decrease of probability for an initial fire to develop 
into a severe fire, depending on the various fire detection and fire fighting 
provisions employed. Indicative values are shown in Table 10.3. 
Table 10-3 Reduction of Probability for a Severe Fire* (Bub et al1979) 
Fire Safety Provision pi 
Average standard public fire brigade 0.1 
Adequately maintained sprinkler system 0.02 
Factory/private fire brigade, depending on standard 0.5-0.05 
Adequately maintained detection and alarm system 1 -0.1 
*All values are mdtcatlve and have to be checked on a natwnal basts 
However, if several safety provisions are employed, the product P1P2 .... should 
be associated with a lower bound to account for the dependency among the 
provisions with regards to their possible success. 
A function f(A) may be introduced, if desired, to account for a risk being 
enhanced as compartment size is increased, e.g. as 
f(A) =A*/A (10.6) 
with A* corresponding, for example, to the average compartment size for a 
certain type of occupancy. 
As an illustration, the acceptable probability of failure for the building in Case 
Study II will be calculated based on this methodology. 
10.3 APPLICATION TO CASE STUDY II 
10.3.1 Calculation of Acceptable Probability of Failure 
(a) Relevant Building Information 
• Purpose Group SA- sleeping in accommodation facility (BIA 1995) 
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• Estimated total compartment floor area (4 storeys extension only): 3600m2 
(b) Tolerable Lifetime Failure Probabilities Pr 
• Economic losses - considered high for hotel business 
• Expected number of fatalities - medium to high 
Two cases will be considered: (i) medium fatalities/high economic losses and (ii) 
high casualties/high economic losses. 
For case (i) the approximate annual acceptable probability of failure Pr is 
obtained from Table 10.1 by dividing the lifetime value by 50 to give a value of2 
X 10-8 
For case (ii) the value ofPr= 2 x 10-9. 
(c) Probability of Occurrence of Severe Fire Pa 
From Table 10.2 the probability of occurrence of fire per m2 per year, p, is taken 
as 10-5 (dwelling). 
The probability of initial fire P(fire) =PAx 
= 10-5(3600)1 
= 0.036. 
From Table 10.3 the following reduction of probability are assumed: 
• Average standard public fire brigade=> P1 = 0.1 
e Adequately maintained sprinkler system=> P2 = 0.02 
• Adequately maintained detection and alarm system =>P3 = 0.01 
:. the annual probability of occurrence of severe fire Pa = P(fire)P1P2Ps 
(d) Value of Function f(A) 
= (0.036)(0.1)(0.02)(0.1) 
= 7.2 X 10-G 
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As data on "average fire compartment size" is not available, the function f(A) 
will be dispensed with. 
(e) Acceptable Probability of Failure and Reliability Index 
Substituting the values of Pf and Pa calculated above into equation (10.3), the 
following acceptable probability of failure are obtained: 
Case (i) Medium fatalities/high economic losses: Pf,a = 2. 77 x 10-3 
The corresponding acceptable reliability index ~a = 2. 77 
Case (ii) High fatalities/high economic losses: Pf,a = 2.77 x 10-4 
The corresponding acceptable reliability index ~a = 3.45 
10.3.2 Qualifying Comment 
It should be stated that the failure stated in Table 10.1 is not structural failure 
under fire condition. It is more of a societal nature with human fatalities and 
economic losses as the principal determinants. However, due to the dearth of 
statistical data on structural failure in fire, the probability of failure as expressed 
in equation (1 0.3) would adopted for the present analysis. 
10.3.3 Target Probability of Failure and Reliability Index 
The target probability of failure and reliability index for any situation can only be 
set after sufficient number of similar analyses as done in section 10.3 .1 have been 
carried out to yield a large enough database. For illustration purpose, the average 
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of the probability of failure from case (i) and (ii) in section 10.3 .1 will be taken 
as the target values: 
Target Probability of failure Pf,t = 1.52 x 10-3 
Target Reliability Index Pt = 2.96 
10.4 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF CASE STUDY I 
In Case Study I the reliability index of the performance of the concrete slab was 
calculated to be 2.89. Assuming that the fire compartments' parameters, fire 
behaviour and risk criteria in Case Study II are applicable, this value of p falls 
short of the target reliability index of 2.96. The concrete is thus considered unsafe 
in its present design. 
10.5 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF CASE STUDY II 
With the target probability of failure and reliability index thus fixed the 
performance of the steel members in Case Study II would be re-examined. The 
results of assessment of the temperature domain calculation is shown in Table 
10-4. 
Table 10-4 Members' Performance (Temperature Domain Analysis) Assessed 
Against Target Reliability Index 
Unprotected Ceiling/wall Shielded Protected 
Steel Member 13 Remark 13 Remark 13 Remark 
BeamAB 2.98 safe 3.42 safe 6 safe 
BeamAC 3.18 safe 3.57 safe 6 safe 
BeamBD 3.88 safe 4.20 safe 6 safe 
BeamEF 0.48 unsafe 1.46 unsafe 6 safe 
ColumnAA' 4.05 safe 6 safe 6 safe 
ColumnBB' 6 safe 6 safe 6 safe 
Column CC' 1.79 unsafe 2.80 unsafe 6 safe 
ColumnDD' 3.81 safe 4.05 safe 6 safe 
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Because a range of performance is involved, the term "safe/unsafe" rather than 
fail/ok is used. From Table 10-4 it can now be ascertained that steel member EF 
performance is unsafe under fire condition. This beam is one of the intermediate 
beams that support the concrete floor slab. 
The same target reliability index will be applied to analyses done under the time 
domain in Case Study II. In this assessment, the most conservative and the least 
conservative time domain analyses will be looked into. The most conservative 
time domain analysis refers to the case where both the "time to attain limiting 
temperature" and the time equivalence are calculated from the spreadsheet. The 
least conservative case is where the "time to attain limiting temperature" is 
calculated from the spreadsheet and the time equivalence is obtained from the 
Eurocode 1 formula (EC1 1994). 
The reliability assessment of the "most conservative" time domain analysis is 
shown in Table 10-5. 
Table 10-5 Members' Performance (Most Conservative Time Domain 
Analysis) Assessed against Target Reliability Index 
Unprotected Ceiling/wall Shielded Protected 
Steel Member 13 Remark 13 Remark 13 Remark 
BeamAB 0 unsafe 0 unsafe 6 safe 
BeamAC 0 unsafe 0 unsafe 6 safe 
BeamBD 0.24 unsafe 0.89 unsafe 6 safe 
BeamEF 0 unsafe 0 unsafe 6 safe 
ColumnAA' 0 unsafe 0 unsafe 6 safe 
ColumnBB' 1.12 unsafe 2.11 unsafe 6 safe 
Column CC' 0 unsafe 0 unsafe 6 safe 
ColumnDD' 0 unsafe 0.45 unsafe 6 safe 
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Table 10-5 shows that only steel members protected by sprayed on mineral fiber 
can be considered safe. All unprotected members, even if they are shielded by 
suspended Gib-board ceiling or Gib-board wall linings, are deemed to be unsafe. 
The same assessment is applied to the case of the "least conservative" time 
domain analysis and the results shown in Table 10-6 
Table 10-6 Members' Performance (Least Conservative Time Domain 
Analysis) Assessed against Target Reliability Index 
Unprotected Ceiling/wall Shielded Protected 
Steel Member 13 Remark 13 Remark 13 Remark 
BeamAB 0.41 unsafe 0.93 unsafe 6 safe 
BeamAC 0.52 unsafe 0.87 unsafe 6 safe 
BeamBD 1.02 unsafe 1.19 unsafe 6 safe 
BeamEF 0 unsafe 0.20 unsafe 6 safe 
ColumnAA' 1.15 unsafe 1.63 unsafe 6 safe 
ColumnBB' 1.71 unsafe 2.04 unsafe 6 safe 
Column CC' 0 unsafe 0.83 unsafe 6 safe 
ColumnDD' 0.82 unsafe 1.38 unsafe 6 safe 
The results from Table 10-6 are not significantly different from the results shown 
in Table 10-5. 
10.6 DISCUSSION 
In this project the structural performance of steel members under different fire 
protection regimes and exposed to "real" fire was first analysed deterministically. 
Under the temperature domain analysis, the results showed that only one of the 
unprotected members would fail under fire condition but all unprotected 
members are safe if the shielding effect of the ceiling and wall linings were 
accounted for. The results for time domain analyses showed a substantial 
increase in the number of members that would fail under fire condition, even 
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when the shielding effect of the ceiling and wall linings were taken into account. 
In both domains of analysis for members protected by sprayed on mineral fiber 
there was no case of failure. 
Reliability analysis using Monte Carlo simulation was then carried out on the 
deterministic calculations. The nominal probabilities of failure of the steel 
members under different protection regimes and exposed to a range of "real" fires 
were calculated. The overall results show that a substantial number of members 
deemed to be safe under the deterministic assessment have relatively high 
probabilities of failure. The final reliability assessment could only be done when 
the acceptable probabilities of failure have been established. 
The acceptable probabilities of failure and reliability index have been worked out in 
this chapter and reliability assessment carried out in section 10.4 and 10.5. 
Considering only results from the temperature domain analysis, the reliability 
assessment in Table 10.4 shows that: 
1. Even if all members are totally unprotected, several have a high enough 
safety index to be considered safe, but some members are very unsafe. 
2. Considering ceiling or wall protection, the safety indices increase, but two 
members are still marginally unsafe. 
3. If all members are protected with spray-on fire protection, the resulting safety 




This project looks into three main areas viz (1) fire engineering design of a steel 
framed building, (2) reliability analysis ofthe design and (3) reliability assessment 
of results from (2). The conclusion from each area and the general conclusion are 
appended below: 
11.1 CONCLUSION FROM FIRE ENGINEERING DESIGN 
This report has shown how it is possible to carry out fire engineering calculations to 
assess whether a simple structural steel member has sufficient strength to carry loads 
throughout a fire. The steel member may be unprotec"te.d, protected by wall and 
ceiling lining materials, or protected by an applied proprietary product. 
11.2 CONCLUSION FROM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF 
DESIGN 
This report has shown how a deterministic assessment of steel member performance 
can be converted into a reliability assessment, taking into account the inherent 
variability of all of the factors considered in the design. 
This report has made calculations in both the temperature domain and the time 
domain, but only those in the temperature domain are considered sufficiently accurate 
for conclusions to be drawn. 
11.3 CONCLUSION FROM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
In this project an indicative target probability of failure and reliability index have 
been worked out. Based on this target reliability index the conclusion that can be 
drawn is that some unprotected steel members will be unsafe, most members 
protected with wall or ceiling linings will be safe enough and all members protected 
with applied fire protection will be very safe. 
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This conclusion is hypothetical, as it is dependent on a large number of assumptions 
as described in this report. 
11.4 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Deterministic or "single value" analysis in design can give very misleading results 
if the variability in properties and the full range of possible scenarios are not taken 
into account. This is especially true for fire engineering design for the very reason 
that fire behaviour and its effect on material properties have a lot of scatter in the 
data. Under such circumstances, the application of reliability assessment would 
highlight any deficiency or shortcoming in the design and provide a good basis for 
re-examining of the design to meet the performance requirement~ 
This report has shown how a simple deterministic calculation can easily be 
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